T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:8
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 8 and 53-61 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned executable dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```yaml metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"🔍","homepage":"https://github.com/Aegis-Scan/aegis-scan","requires":{"bins":["aegis"],"config":["~/.aegis/config.yaml"]},"install":[{"kind":"uv","package":"aegis-audit","bins":["aegis"]}]}} ``` ```markdown Install from [PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/aegis-audit/) using pip or uv: ```bash pip install aegis-audit ``` ```bash uv tool install aegis-audit ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill metadata and documented installation commands install `aegis-audit` from PyPI without pinning an exact version or verifying an artifact hash. Consequently, installation resolves whichever package version the package index currently considers appropriate rather than the version reviewed when this skill was published. The project itself contains only documentation and licensing files; it does not include the executable implementation of the `aegis` command. Therefore, the behavior of the code ultimately installed and executed cannot be verified from this project. Although the documentation recommends pinning a version, neither the machine-readable installation metadata nor the primary installation commands enforce that recommendation. This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current PyPI package is malicious. Exploitation would require compromise or malicious control of the package publication or dependency-resolution process. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the relevant package publisher account, package index, or release process, or causes a malicious future package version to be published. 2. A user or agent installs the skill using the metadata-driven installer or runs `pip install aegis-audit` or `uv tool install aegis-audit`. 3. Because no version and artifact hash are enf ...[truncated 940 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the package to a specific audited version in the machine-readable metadata, for example `aegis-audit==1.3.x`, using the exact release that has been reviewed. 2. Update every installation example to use the same exact version rather than an unconstrained package name. 3. Require cryptographic hash verification for downloaded distributions, such as a hash-locked requirements file with `pip --require-hashes`. 4. Publish and verify signed release artifacts or trusted provenance attestations where supported. 5. Include the executable source in the reviewed project or reference an immutable source commit so reviewers can correlate the installed artifact with audited code. 6. Treat upgrades as explicit security-review events rather than silently resolving the newest available release. 7. Run the scanner under a least-privileged account or sandbox with restricted filesystem, credential, and network access to reduce the impact of a compromised dependency.