Incomplete referenced artifact analysis
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js notebooks
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
ClawScan rates this skill suspicious with medium confidence, citing excessive agency concerns and incomplete inspection of much of the artifact.
Consider the reported authenticated-request and scheduling concerns before installing. Inspection was partial: the scanner reports 8 of 22 components scanned, with static analysis degraded for some files, so the available evidence is incomplete. The verdict is suspicious, not a finding that the author acted maliciously.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js notebooks
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js notebooks --set "<notebook-id>,<notebook-id>"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js notes --notebook <notebook-id>
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js fetch
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js push --dry-run
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js push
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
echo '{"headline":"two notes into your wiki"}' | node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js report
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js history --limit 20
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js schedule --cron "0 7 * * *" --tz America/Los_Angeles
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js schedule --off
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js host --set javis-mac
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/notebooklm-ingest.js doctor
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- **Normalise, then hash.** `scripts/normalize.js` is the only place that
YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
he research spike, with no
automation challenge (F49). In HiJavis the same thing happens through the in-app
sign-in webview, the mechanism Luma's cookie capture already uses.
**Javis never types a Google credential.** Not into a form, not into a CLI
prompt, not from a stored value. If a path seems to require it, that path is
wrong.
Chrome's own cookie store is **not** an alternative: `--browser-cookies chrome`
failed on every profile with "macOS Keychain item not found" (F51), and a
broader sweep of other browsers' cookie stores was deliberately not performed.
Reading a browser's credential store is not a fallback this design has.
## What this bundle may say about it
**Path, presence, size, mtime, and a sha256 digest of the file.** That is the
whole of `credentialFingerprint()`, and it is what `doctor` reports.
**Never a cookie name, and never a cookie value.** Not in stdout, not in a
digest pushed to the user's chat, not in a log line, not in a refusal's detail
field, and never t
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
verything below is gmail-wiki-ingest's
* sanitizer (gmail-wiki-ingest.js:354-444), carried across wholesale rather
* than re-derived, so that a hostile title is **visible but inert**: it renders
* as literal text, it cannot forge a bullet or a footer line, and nothing
* downstream feeds it back to the agent as instruction.
*
* The agent's own headline goes through the identical treatment: a model that
* has just read a hostile title is perfectly capable of relaying one.
*/
const MAX_TITLE_CHARS = 80;
const MAX_PROSE_CHARS = 120;
const URL_RE = /(?:[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/|www\.|mailto:|data:|javascript:)\S*/gi;
const EMAIL_RE =
/([^\s@<>()[\]",;:]+)@([a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(?:\.[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?)+)/gi;
// The backslash is FIRST in the class: a title that supplies its own `\` before
// an active character would otherwise consume the escape we are about to add.
const MD_ACTIVE_RE = /[\\*_[\]()`<>]/g;
const LINE_BREAKING_RE = new RegExp('[\\u0000-\\u001F\\u0
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
});
test('R13: a hostile schedule string stays one argv element', () => {
const argv = cron.buildCronAdd({ cron: '0 7 * * * ; rm -rf /' });
assert.equal(argv.filter((a) => a.includes('rm -rf')).length, 1);
});
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
});
test('argv: a hostile notebook title is one argument, not shell syntax', () => {
const argv = cli.argvNoteGet('x"; rm -rf / #', 'p');
assert.deepEqual(argv, ['-p', 'p', 'note', 'get', 'x"; rm -rf / #']);
assert.equal(argv.length, 5, 'the injection attempt stays a single argv element');
});
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
});
test('R13: a hostile schedule string stays one argv element', () => {
const argv = cron.buildCronAdd({ cron: '0 7 * * * ; rm -rf /' });
assert.equal(argv.filter((a) => a.includes('rm -rf')).length, 1);
});
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
});
test('R13: a hostile schedule string stays one argv element', () => {
const argv = cron.buildCronAdd({ cron: '0 7 * * * ; rm -rf /' });
assert.equal(argv.filter((a) => a.includes('rm -rf')).length, 1);
});
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
});
test('argv: a hostile notebook title is one argument, not shell syntax', () => {
const argv = cli.argvNoteGet('x"; rm -rf / #', 'p');
assert.deepEqual(argv, ['-p', 'p', 'note', 'get', 'x"; rm -rf / #']);
assert.equal(argv.length, 5, 'the injection attempt stays a single argv element');
});
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// list and remove
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
test('R13: list asks for json and all jobs; remove is positional by id', () => {
YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
test: true }), ['-p', 'spike', 'auth', 'check', '--test']);
assert.deepEqual(cli.argvDoctor('spike'), ['-p', 'spike', 'doctor']);
assert.deepEqual(
cli.argvDownloadReport('r-1', '/tmp/r.md', 'spike'),
['-p', 'spike', 'download', 'report', 'r-1', '/tmp/r.md'],
);
});
test('argv: a hostile notebook title is one argument, not shell syntax', () => {
const argv = cli.argvNoteGet('x"; rm -rf / #', 'p');
assert.deepEqual(argv, ['-p', 'p', 'note', 'get', 'x"; rm -rf / #']);
assert.equal(argv.length, 5, 'the injection attempt stays a single argv element');
});
test('argv: a missing id throws rather than building a command that means something else', () => {
assert.throws(() => cli.argvNoteGet('', 'p'), /noteId is required/);
assert.throws(() => cli.argvNoteList(null, 'p'), /notebookId is required/);
assert.throws(() => cli.argvDownloadReport('r', '', 'p'), /destination is required/);
});
test('argv: no profile omits the flag entirely rather than passing an empty on
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
test('argv: a hostile notebook title is one argument, not shell syntax', () => {
const argv = cli.argvNoteGet('x"; rm -rf / #', 'p');
assert.deepEqual(argv, ['-p', 'p', 'note', 'get', 'x"; rm -rf / #']);
assert.equal(argv.length, 5, 'the injection attempt stays a single argv element');
});
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
test('argv: a hostile notebook title is one argument, not shell syntax', () => {
const argv = cli.argvNoteGet('x"; rm -rf / #', 'p');
assert.deepEqual(argv, ['-p', 'p', 'note', 'get', 'x"; rm -rf / #']);
assert.equal(argv.length, 5, 'the injection attempt stays a single argv element');
});
Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.
assert.match(trigger, /remove <id>/, 'removal is positional by id');
});
test('the cli contract documents the jar location and the never-print rule', () => {
const doc = DOCS['references/cli-contract.md'];
assert.match(doc, /\$NOTEBOOKLM_HOME\/profiles\/<profile>\/storage_state\.json/);
assert.match(doc, /Path, presence, size, mtime and a sha256 digest/);