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Security audit

Deploy an agent on AgentsPodium

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is transparent about deploying paid always-on agents, but it combines mailbox/token access, crypto payments, and destructive management actions without enough safeguards.

Review before installing. Use this only for explicit AgentsPodium deployment requests, require human confirmation before creating agents, paying, changing plans, installing tools, or deleting anything, and prefer a dedicated mailbox plus a secure secret store for tokens. Do not connect a personal mailbox or leave bearer tokens in prompts, logs, shell history, or plaintext files.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:53
Finding

Overprivileged Mailbox Access and Insecure Long-Lived Bearer Token Storage

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 53–61
Vulnerability Type: Excessive mailbox permissions and insecure credential-storage guidance
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Vulnerable Snippet

markdown
The six-digit code is emailed and lives for a few minutes. `/auth/request`
always answers `202` whether or not the address has an account — it will not
tell you which, so a wrong address looks exactly like a right one.

**This is the step to plan for.** An agent running unattended needs read access
to a mailbox — an IMAP account, a mail API, or a human who pastes the code
once. Do this first and cache the token; it is a bearer token, sent as
`Authorization: Bearer <token>` on everything below, and it lasts far longer
than a deployment takes.

Technical Analysis

The Skill recommends giving an unattended agent read access to a mailbox so that it can retrieve a short-lived authentication code. General IMAP or mail API access can grant visibility into unrelated messages and sensitive account-recovery information, exceeding the minimum privilege needed to retrieve one AgentsPodium verification code.

The Skill also directs the agent to cache a bearer token that remains valid substantially longer than the deployment operation. It does not prescribe encrypted secret storage, restrictive file permissions, log redaction, token lifecycle controls, or deletion after use. A bearer token requires no additional proof of identity; any party that obtains it can exercise its associated account permissions until it expires.

No evidence shows that the Skill intentionally transmits mailbox contents or credentials to an attacker. The issue is unsafe access and secret-management guidance rather than confirmed credential exfiltration.

Attack Path

  1. An operator grants the unattended agent general IMAP or mail API access to a mailbox.
  2. The agent retrieves the AgentsPodium authentication email ...[truncated 1179 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Prefer one-time human entry of the verification code rather than unattended mailbox access.
  2. If automation is necessary, use a dedicated mailbox that receives only AgentsPodium authentication messages.
  3. Use a narrowly scoped mail API that can access only the required sender, label, folder, or message type instead of granting general IMAP access.
  4. Store the bearer token in an operating-system secret manager or managed secrets vault, never in plaintext files, prompts, shell history, or logs.
  5. Restrict token access to the deployment process and apply least-privilege filesystem and runtime permissions.
  6. Redact authentication codes and bearer tokens from application, HTTP, and diagnostic logs.
  7. Define token expiration, rotation, revocation, and cleanup procedures. Delete the cached token after the workflow when continued access is unnecessary.
  8. Isolate the deployment agent from untrusted skills, tools, users, and workloads that could inspect its environment or secret store.
  9. Update the Skill documentation to warn explicitly that primary or personal mailboxes must not be connected.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (3)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Exposing a raw DELETE /agents/:id management action in a general-purpose skill creates a direct path for tool parameter abuse: if an attacker can influence the target id or induce the agent to perform lifecycle operations, the agent may delete the wrong resource. This is especially dangerous because the same skill handles authenticated agent management, so misuse could destroy deployed services and associated state.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 179)May include surrounding context.

md
| Set the pod timezone | `PATCH /timezone` |
| Back up now | `POST /backup` |
| Check it is alive | `GET /liveness` |
| Delete it | `DELETE /agents/:id` |

Pause is worth knowing about: it closes the pod rather than idling it, so a
paused agent costs nothing, and `resume` rebuilds from the last snapshot.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill description is broad enough to trigger on common phrases like 'spin up another agent,' which can cause the agent to invoke deployment behavior in situations where the user did not intend infrastructure provisioning or payment actions. Because this skill can create external resources and initiate crypto-payment workflows, overbroad activation materially increases the chance of unintended, high-consequence actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill documents destructive deletion capability (DELETE /agents/:id) without an adjacent safety warning, confirmation requirement, or recovery caveat. In a skill that provisions and manages always-on agents, omission of deletion safeguards makes accidental or prompt-manipulated destructive actions more likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.