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Security audit

Mallary Openclaw Skill

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This Mallary skill is transparent about its purpose, but it gives an agent broad social-account authority and allows real publishing actions without a final confirmation step.

Install only if you are comfortable giving Mallary broad account access and having your agent publish, schedule, upload media, or reply after it interprets your request as clear. For brand, client, or public-facing accounts, explicitly ask for a preview and final approval before posting, and keep API keys in a secret manager rather than chat or shell history.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The documentation states that OAuth device authorization grants read, publish, engage, and manage access in one login and that users do not choose scopes. This violates least-privilege principles by normalizing broad account access even for read-only use, increasing the blast radius if tokens are stolen, misused by an agent, or used for unintended write operations.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The file explicitly authorizes executing a publish action without a second confirmation once the user's request is interpreted as clear. That creates a meaningful risk of unintended external side effects from ambiguous phrasing, mistaken intent classification, or prompt-injection-mediated reframing of a user's request, especially because publishing to external destinations is irreversible or reputationally sensitive.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
1. use minimum read-only discovery to resolve the current profile and destination
2. ask only for a material detail that is missing or ambiguous
3. execute the requested action once without asking for another confirmation
4. verify the result with a read-only command

An OAuth setup or discovery request is not a request to post. For deletion, disconnection, or another destructive account action, follow the stronger safeguards in [SKILL.md](./SKILL.md).
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly authorizes the agent to carry out state-changing actions after a user request without a final confirmation step. For actions like publishing, scheduling, uploading media, or sending replies, this increases the chance of unintended or incorrect external actions if the agent misinterprets intent, resolves the wrong destination/profile, or misses important context. In this skill context, the danger is elevated because the OAuth flow grants broad write access across Mallary capabilities.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
- begin with the lowest-risk read-only command that can answer the request
- request the minimum data needed and redact sensitive operational output before sharing it
- never use a data-transmitting or state-changing action as a setup, authentication, or smoke test
- if the user clearly requests publishing, scheduling, an upload for that post, or a reply, follow [SKILL.md](./SKILL.md), resolve any missing material detail, and execute without asking for another confirmation
- run a requested action once and verify it with a read-only command

Installation, authentication, or discovery alone is not a request to publish or change Mallary.
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The README explicitly instructs an agent to execute publishing, scheduling, upload, or reply actions without a second confirmation once it interprets the user's request as clear. In an agent context, this increases the chance of unauthorized or mistaken state-changing actions from ambiguous prompts, prompt injection in surrounding context, or mis-resolved details, especially because the skill is designed to interact with real external accounts.

VirusTotal

57/57 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.