Security audit

ERC20 Tokenomics Builder

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent tokenomics guide, but its vesting deployment examples can create contracts and transfer real tokens without enough safety checks.

Review this skill carefully before installing or using it for deployment work. Treat its vesting scripts as illustrative only: test on a testnet first, verify chain ID and addresses, use SafeERC20 or equivalent transfer checks, read token decimals with parseUnits, confirm balances and allowances, validate every beneficiary and schedule, and require explicit confirmation before broadcasting transactions or transferring treasury tokens.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

Location: references/vesting-factory.md:91
Finding: Unchecked ERC20 Transfer Result Can Leave Vesting Wallets Unfunded
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

Location: references/vesting-factory.md:121
Finding: Hardcoded 18-Decimal Conversion Can Misallocate Vesting Tokens
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (3)

Ae4

Medium

Category: analysis-evasion
Confidence: 80% confidence
Finding: Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The Foundry and Hardhat examples perform live contract creation and token transfers in loops with no safety checks, dry-run guidance, or explicit confirmation steps. In a vesting context, mistakes in beneficiary addresses, timestamps, durations, or token amounts are irreversible on-chain and can permanently misallocate treasury assets or lock them into unintended wallets.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The Release Keeper example calls factory.allWallets(0, count), but the factory shown only exposes the public array getter allWallets(uint256) and totalWallets(). An operator copying this automation will either fail at runtime or implement ad hoc workarounds, which can break release automation and leave vested tokens unreleased until manually corrected.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.