T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:4- Finding
Unpinned Mutable GitHub Dependency
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 4
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency from a mutable remote repository
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet:
yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"📝","requires":{"bins":["qmd"]},"install":[{"id":"node","kind":"node","package":"https://github.com/tobi/qmd","bins":["qmd"],"label":"Install qmd (node)"}]}}Technical Analysis
The installation metadata references
https://github.com/tobi/qmdwithout pinning an immutable commit SHA, versioned release artifact, or integrity checksum. Consequently, the code retrieved during installation may change after this Skill has been reviewed.This creates a supply-chain trust boundary: installation and runtime security depend on the continuing integrity of the remote repository, its maintainers, and its transitive dependencies. If that source is compromised or modified unexpectedly, a later installation could execute code different from the code originally audited. The package implementation is not included in this project, so its installation scripts, runtime operations, and transitive dependencies could not be verified during this audit.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, a maintainer account, the package's release process, or a dependency used by the remote project.
- The attacker adds malicious Node.js installation or runtime code to the mutable upstream source.
- A user installs the Skill dependency using the declared GitHub URL.
- The installation mechanism retrieves the altered upstream content because no immutable revision or integrity value is specified.
- The malicious code executes with the privileges of the account performing installation or invoking
qmd. - Within those privileges, the payload could access files readable by that account, including files selected for indexing and generated index data, or communicate data to an attack ...[truncated 907 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the mutable repository reference with an immutable, reviewed commit SHA or a versioned release artifact.
- Verify the downloaded artifact using a cryptographic checksum or supported package-manager integrity metadata.
- Prefer a trusted registry package only when its package name, publisher identity, provenance, and release history have been verified.
- Lock all transitive dependencies with an auditable lockfile and use reproducible or frozen dependency installation.
- Review upstream installation scripts and runtime code before approving a pinned revision.
- Enable automated dependency and provenance monitoring, but require review before updating the pinned revision.
- Run the tool with least privilege and restrict its file and network access to the minimum required for local indexing and configured Ollama communication.
