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Security audit

golang-google-wire

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent Go dependency-injection helper, with no evidence of hidden behavior or malicious actions.

Reasonable to install for Go projects using google/wire. For stricter environments, pin the Wire version instead of using @latest and run code generation in a normal least-privileged development or CI context.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:20
Finding

Unpinned Executable Dependency Installation

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:20-24, SKILL.md:31, and SKILL.md:47
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

The skill repeatedly instructs users to install the Google Wire executable using the mutable latest version selector.

yaml
install:
  - kind: go
    package: github.com/google/wire/cmd/wire@latest
    bins: [wire]
markdown
- wire: `go install github.com/google/wire/cmd/wire@latest`
bash
go get -tool github.com/google/wire/cmd/wire@latest
go get github.com/google/wire

Technical Analysis

The @latest selector resolves the executable dependency at installation time rather than selecting a fixed, reviewed release. Consequently, two developers or CI jobs following the same instructions at different times may install different code.

The dependency points to the official Google Wire module, and the audit found no evidence of typosquatting, dependency confusion, or a currently malicious release. Nevertheless, installing a mutable executable version creates a supply-chain exposure: a compromised upstream publication path, repository, maintainer account, or unsafe future release could cause unreviewed code to be installed and subsequently executed.

This concern is especially relevant because the installed artifact is a command-line executable rather than a passive documentation dependency. The resulting wire binary is expected to run against source repositories and therefore receives the access granted to the invoking developer or CI process.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the upstream module release process, maintainer credentials, repository, or another component involved in publishing a future Google Wire release.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release that Go resolves through the @latest selector.
  3. A developer or CI runner follows the skill instructions and installs `github.com/google/wire ...[truncated 1139 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace every @latest installation instruction with a specific, reviewed release. For example:

    bash
    go install github.com/google/wire/cmd/wire@v0.7.0
    go get -tool github.com/google/wire/cmd/wire@v0.7.0
    go get github.com/google/wire@v0.7.0
    
  2. Update the metadata declaration to use the same pinned version:

    yaml
    install:
      - kind: go
        package: github.com/google/wire/cmd/wire@v0.7.0
        bins: [wire]
    
  3. Keep the pinned version consistent across metadata, dependency documentation, setup commands, and CI examples.

  4. Review version upgrades explicitly rather than resolving them automatically. Validate release provenance, inspect relevant upstream changes, and test generated output before updating the pinned version.

  5. Retain Go checksum verification and use a controlled module proxy or approved dependency mirror in sensitive CI environments.

  6. Run dependency installation and code generation in a least-privileged, isolated CI job without unnecessary production credentials.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

This is a JSON manifest-style file, so vague-trigger review applies. The natural-language prompt text is phrased in a very general way and does not narrow when the skill should activate versus similar generic 'how should I structure this' requests, which could contribute to unintended invocation if this content is reused as activation guidance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.