T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
assets/claude-code-review.yml:16- Finding
Prompt injection exposure in AI review workflow with repository-wide write and log-read privileges
- Content
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" additional_permissions: | actions: read claude_args: >- --allowedTools "mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment,mcp__context7__resolve-library-id,mcp__context7__query-docs,Bash(gh pr comment:*),Bash(gh pr diff:*),Bash(gh pr view:*)" ``` The same privileged action pattern is repeated in the `correctness`, `security`, and `quality-depth` jobs. The prompts also direct the agent to load repository-controlled files: ```yaml Note: the PR branch is already checked out in the current working directory. Check project guidelines: @./CLAUDE.md Check contributing guidelines: @./CONTRIBUTING.md Check project description: @./docs/project-summary.md ``` The workflow exposes a log-reading agent after the review jobs: ```yaml ci-diagnosis: name: Review — CI Failure Diagnosis runs-on: ubuntu-latest ...[truncated 4987 chars]- Remediation
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