T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:14- Finding
Overbroad Git Command Permission Violates Least Privilege
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly a coherent Go concurrency helper, but it requests unrestricted Git command access that can change repository state beyond the stated need.
Install only if you are comfortable granting the agent broad repository editing and unrestricted Git authority. Prefer running it in a working tree without valuable uncommitted work or remote credentials, or narrow Git access to read-only commands unless a task explicitly needs mutation.
SKILL.md:14Overbroad Git Command Permission Violates Least Privilege
The comment on L296 asserts safety because each goroutine writes to its own index, but the closure directly captures loop variables i and url from the range loop. Unlike the earlier WaitGroup section, this example does not restate the Go 1.22+ loop-variable condition or make defensive copies, so the documentation's safety claim can be false in older modules and is internally inconsistent with the file's own earlier caution.
The file earlier gives strong normative guidance to avoid holding synchronization primitives across blocking operations, yet the sync.Once example wraps sql.Open inside Once.Do without any caveat. While sync.Once is not a mutex, the surrounding guidance presents an intent of minimizing blocking inside synchronization, and the example appears to normalize potentially blocking one-time initialization under a sync primitive.
No suspicious patterns detected.