T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
requirements.txt, lines 1–4
Vulnerability Type:T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
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All third-party packages are specified without exact versions or integrity hashes. Consequently, each installation may resolve to a different package release than the versions originally reviewed and tested. The dependency list also provides no cryptographic mechanism for verifying that downloaded artifacts are the approved artifacts.
This creates supply-chain exposure if a dependency's distribution account or release process is compromised. It also allows an unreviewed future release to be installed automatically. The audit found no evidence that the listed package names are typosquatted or currently malicious; the issue is the absence of deterministic and integrity-verified dependency resolution.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the release channel, maintainer account, or distribution artifact of a listed dependency.
- The attacker publishes a malicious release under the legitimate package name.
- A user installs the project dependencies from the unconstrained
requirements.txt. - The package manager resolves the affected dependency to the malicious release.
- Malicious package code executes during installation or when imported by
main.py.
Impact Assessment
Malicious dependency code could run with the privileges of the user installing or invoking the skill. It could access files, environment variables, network resources, and credentials available to that user, modify local data, or execute additional processes. The scope would be limited by the operating-system permissions and sandbox controls applied to the installation and runtime environment.
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every direct dependency to an exact, reviewed version using
==. - Generate a lock file that captures reviewed transitive dependency versions.
- Record cryptographic hashes for all resolved artifacts and install with hash verification, such as
pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt. - Retrieve packages only from explicitly configured, trusted registries over TLS.
- Integrate dependency vulnerability, provenance, and package-name checks into CI.
- Review and test dependency updates before deliberately regenerating the lock file and hashes.
- Install and execute the skill in a least-privileged, isolated environment with restricted filesystem and network access.
- Pin every direct dependency to an exact, reviewed version using
