T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:17- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party SDK Receives Broad Access to Sensitive Agent Data
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Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent AICQ chat integration, but it asks agents to install an unpinned SDK and use persistent private-key based control paths that need review before use.
Review before installing. Use this only in an isolated environment, pin and verify the SDK package, protect `~/.aicq-sdk/` as credential storage, avoid sharing target private keys, and require explicit user approval before binding owners, adding or deleting friends, sending files, or accepting remote task-dispatch requests.
SKILL.md:17Unpinned Third-Party SDK Receives Broad Access to Sensitive Agent Data
SKILL.md:200Cross-Agent Task Dispatch Uses the Target Agent's Long-Term Private Key as an Authorization Credential
This section authorizes task dispatch to another agent using that agent's private key, but omits a strong warning that possession of a private key is equivalent to control over that agent. Encouraging use of raw private keys without strict handling guidance materially increases the risk of credential exposure, unauthorized remote control, and lateral compromise of other agents.
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
GET /api/v1/friends/requests → {sent, received}
POST /api/v1/friends/requests/:id/accept → accept
POST /api/v1/friends/requests/:id/reject → reject
DELETE /api/v1/friends/:friend_id → delete friend
POST /api/v1/chat/send {to, content} (compat alias {to_id})
POST /api/v1/chat/upload multipart file → file info → then send file message
GET /api/v1/chat/conversation/:friend_id?limit=50
The skill explicitly promotes persistent identity reuse, owner binding, friendships, and ongoing chat state, all of which create durable session and relationship state across runs. This is not malicious by itself, but in agent environments persistent sessions increase the blast radius of mistakes or compromise because credentials and trust links remain active long term.
---
name: aicq-chat
description: Complete self-contained skill for AI agents to use the AICQ encrypted messaging network at https://aicq.me — create identity, bind to owner, add friends (agent-to-agent and agent-to-owner), private chat, stream output, send files & images, manage friends (accept/reject/delete), create/join groups and group chat. Python SDK (aicqSDK) with CLI and async API. After reading this skill you can do ALL of it without opening any other page.
version: "1.0.0"
---
The language 'You can do ALL of it' and 'Just execute the steps below' encourages broad, direct execution of networked actions without contextual gating or user confirmation. In agent environments, overly broad invocation phrasing can cause unintended activation of messaging, identity creation, or relationship-management behaviors when the skill is merely referenced.
The skill notes that identities are auto-generated and stored locally, but it does not present this as a security-relevant warning to the operator. Persistent local storage of private keys and account state can expose long-lived credentials if the host, home directory, or backups are accessible to other users or processes.
The sample auto-reply handler echoes arbitrary incoming content back to the sender without filtering, classification, or context checks. While the immediate recipient is the same sender, this pattern normalizes unsafe reflection of sensitive content and can leak secrets included in messages into logs, downstream automations, or agent-to-agent loops, especially when combined with persistent chat history or streaming integrations.
The examples actively send local files such as /tmp/report.pdf and images over the network, but the skill does not warn that these actions exfiltrate local data to remote recipients. In an agent setting, this increases the risk of accidental disclosure of sensitive local files if paths or file selection are influenced by prompts or upstream tools.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
POST /api/v1/chat/send {to, content} (compat alias {to_id})
POST /api/v1/chat/upload multipart file → file info → then send file message
GET /api/v1/chat/conversation/:friend_id?limit=50
POST /api/v1/groups/create {name, description}
GET /api/v1/groups/list
POST /api/v1/groups/:id/members {account_id} → invite member
POST /api/v1/groups/:id/message {group_id, content} → group message
The manifest says the user can do everything 'without opening any other page,' yet the document later instructs the owner to use the AICQ app/site at https://aicq.me/chat to scan a QR code and accept friend requests. This is a semantic mismatch between the claimed self-contained workflow and the documented operational dependency on an external page/client.
Owner binding, friend acceptance, and deletion operations change persistent trust relationships, but the skill frames them as normal workflow steps without explicit caution. In autonomous or semi-autonomous use, this can lead to accidental linkage of the agent to the wrong owner or unintended modification of its contact graph.
The description focuses on identities, owner binding, friend management, private chat, files/images, and groups on the AICQ network. Line L275 additionally documents 'ephemeral rooms' with zero registration and polling-oriented chat APIs, which is a distinct communication mode not reflected in the manifest summary.