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Security audit

Video to GIF

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently converts local video files to GIFs using ffmpeg, with no hidden network, persistence, credential, or unrelated behavior found.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the skill run ffmpeg/ffprobe on local video files and create or overwrite the GIF output path you provide. Review output paths before running because the converter uses overwrite mode for the selected output file.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to invoke shell-capable commands (`command -v`, `python3`, and indirectly `ffmpeg`/`ffprobe`) but does not declare any `permissions` or `allowed-tools` scope. That creates an authorization gap where an agent may execute shell actions without an explicit least-privilege boundary, increasing the risk of unintended command execution or policy bypass if the skill is reused in broader contexts.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
print("Converting...")

    try:
        subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
        print("Conversion succeeded.")
        return True
    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
frame_rate = "unknown"

    try:
        result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
        info = result.stdout.strip().split(",")
        if len(info) >= 3:
            width, height = info[0], info[1]
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The short description states the skill provides "bilingual guidance," which imposes a language behavior without any indication that the user can choose or opt into it. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language mode without user choice is a natural-language policy concern.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.