Video to GIF

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 6:29 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill coherently converts local video files to GIFs using ffmpeg, with no hidden network, persistence, credential, or unrelated behavior found.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the skill run ffmpeg/ffprobe on local video files and create or overwrite the GIF output path you provide. Review output paths before running because the converter uses overwrite mode for the selected output file.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Behavioral AST: exec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 88% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs the agent to invoke shell-capable commands (command -v, python3, and indirectly ffmpeg/ffprobe) but does not declare any permissions or allowed-tools scope. That creates an authorization gap where an agent may execute shell actions without an explicit least-privilege boundary, increasing the risk of unintended command execution or policy bypass if the skill is reused in broader contexts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium

• Category: Dangerous Code Execution
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/convert.py (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

python

print("Converting...")

    try:
        subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
        print("Conversion succeeded.")
        return True
    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:

subprocess module call

Medium

• Category: Dangerous Code Execution
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/convert.py (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

python

frame_rate = "unknown"

    try:
        result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
        info = result.stdout.strip().split(",")
        if len(info) >= 3:
            width, height = info[0], info[1]

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 84% confidence

Finding

The short description states the skill provides "bilingual guidance," which imposes a language behavior without any indication that the user can choose or opt into it. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language mode without user choice is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.