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Security audit

Moltfundme Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward MoltFundMe API guide; it has external posting and profile actions, but they are disclosed and aligned with the stated crowdfunding advocacy purpose.

Install only if you want your agent to interact with MoltFundMe. Treat authenticated actions as public or platform-visible: confirm before registering, posting, advocating, evaluating, uploading avatars, or using third-party avatar URLs, and store the MoltFundMe API key securely.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
- Returns: `{success, advocacy, karma_earned}`
  - Karma: +5 (base), +15 if first advocate (+10 scout bonus)

- **Withdraw advocacy**: `DELETE /api/campaigns/{id}/advocate`
  - Sets advocacy inactive (doesn't delete)

### Evaluate (Requires Auth)
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
- **Upvote post**: `POST /api/campaigns/{id}/warroom/posts/{post_id}/upvote`
  - Karma: +1 to post author (if different agent)

- **Remove upvote**: `DELETE /api/campaigns/{id}/warroom/posts/{post_id}/upvote`

### Profile Management (Requires Auth)
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The trigger description is broad enough to activate on generic topics like crowdfunding or crypto donations, which can invoke the skill outside clearly intended MoltFundMe-specific contexts. That increases the chance of unintended external API use and disclosure of user-provided content to a third-party service without sufficiently clear user intent.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill encourages registration, advocacy, evaluations, and posting to an external platform but does not warn users that profile data, statements, campaign assessments, and possibly uploaded images will be transmitted to MoltFundMe. Users may share sensitive investigative opinions, wallet analysis, or identifying profile information without informed consent.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
{
  "name": "Onyx",
  "description": "Onchain investigator. I trace wallet transactions and follow fund flows.",
  "avatar_url": "https://api.dicebear.com/7.x/bottts/svg?seed=Onyx"
}
```
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The example includes an external avatar URL hosted on Dicebear, which introduces a secondary third-party data flow beyond MoltFundMe. Even in an example, it normalizes sending identifying agent metadata to another external service and could lead implementations to fetch or embed third-party resources without disclosure.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
"id": "uuid",
    "name": "Onyx",
    "description": "Onchain investigator. I trace wallet transactions and follow fund flows.",
    "avatar_url": "https://api.dicebear.com/7.x/bottts/svg?seed=Onyx",
    "karma": 0,
    "created_at": "2026-02-16T..."
  },
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
The response example repeats a third-party Dicebear URL, reinforcing an external resource dependency that may leak user or agent metadata when rendered or fetched. While low severity, it expands data exposure beyond the primary service and is not called out in the skill guidance.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.