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Security audit

EDA Spec2GDS

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed EDA workflow helper, but installation and dashboard defaults create review-worthy host-privilege and data-exposure risks.

Install or run this only in a disposable VM or dedicated EDA machine. Review the setup scripts before use, avoid permanent docker-group membership where possible, do not expose the dashboard outside localhost, pin Docker images by digest, and treat specs, RTL, logs, and GDS outputs as potentially sensitive.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh:23
Finding

Persistent Root-Equivalent Access Through Docker Service and Group Membership

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/serve_multi_project_dashboard.py:27
Finding

Unauthenticated Network Exposure of EDA Projects and Generated Artifacts

Content
View full analysis
:{port}/index.html') ``` ### Technical Analysis Both HTTP servers bind to `0.0.0.0`, making them reachable through every configured network interface where firewall policy permits. Neither server implements authentication, authorization, transport encryption, or request-origin restrictions. The multi-project server changes its working directory to the complete `eda-runs` directory and uses `SimpleHTTPRequestHandler`. Consequently, its document root is not limited to generated dashboard files. Reachable clients may request raw specifications, normalized specifications, RTL, testbenches, logs, synthesis output, reports, and backend artifacts. The demo server has a narrower document root, but it still publishes report content to all network interfaces without access control. This implementation also conflicts with the mitigation documented in `references/SECURITY.md`, which recommends binding dashboards to localhost. ### Attack Path 1. A user starts either artifact server on a workstation, VM, CI host, or cloud instance. 2. The process listens on all network interfaces on port 8765 or 8766 by default. 3. A remote party on a reachable network discovers or predicts the listening port. 4. The remote party sends unauthenticated HTTP requests to the server. 5. Fo ...[truncated 836 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/run_synth.sh:14
Finding

Yosys Command Injection Through Unvalidated Synthesis Parameters

Content
View full analysis
"$WORK_DIR/synth.ys" <"$WORK_DIR/synth.log" 2>&1 ``` ### Technical Analysis The script inserts `RTL_FILE`, `TOP`, and `WORK_DIR` directly into a Yosys command file without validating or safely encoding them. Although the shell variables are quoted when initially assigned and when Yosys is launched, shell quoting does not protect values after they are interpolated into the generated `synth.ys` program. An argument can contain newline characters or syntax meaningful to Yosys. A crafted top-module name or path can therefore terminate the intended command and add another Yosys command. Because Yosys supports commands that interact with the operating system, successful injection can lead to arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running the Skill. Ordinary Verilog module names do not require arbitrary control characters. An allowlist based on valid Verilog identifier syntax would prevent this injection while preserving legitimate use. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker controls or influences the top-module parameter, RTL path, or synthesis work-directory argument. 2. The attacker includes a newline followed by an additional Yosys command in the supplied value. 3. `run_synth.sh` writes the malicious value verbatim into `synth.ys`. 4. The script invokes `yosys -s synth.ys`. 5. Yosys parses the injected line as an independent command. 6. Any operating-system command launched through the injected Yosys instruction runs as the account executing the synthesis script. ### Impact Assessment Exploitation provides code execution under the Skill user's account. Depending on that ...[truncated 508 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
&2 exit 1 fi ``` 2. Reject newline, carriage-return, NUL, and other control characters in every value inserted into a Yosys script. 3. Resolve paths before use and restrict them to an approved project root. 4. Use Yosys-compatible path quoting or escaping rather than placing raw paths into the command file. 5. Reject work directories containing characters that cannot be represented safely in Yosys syntax. 6. Where supported, pass values through a structured Yosys API or fixed wrapper rather than generating executable command text. 7. Add regression tests using spaces, quotes, semicolons, brackets, and embedded newlines in all three arguments. 8. Run synthesis in a sandbox without Docker-socket access, sensitive environment variables, or write access outside the project directory. ]]>

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
scripts/bootstrap_eda_demo.sh:86
Finding

Unverified and Mutable Third-Party EDA Dependencies

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
``` 2. Maintain a reviewed requirements or constraints file that pins the complete Python dependency graph. 3. Install Python dependencies with verified hashes: ```bash pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.lock ``` 4. Pin the pip version instead of performing an unrestricted upgrade. 5. Record dependency versions and image digests in generated run metadata for reproducibility. 6. Verify container signatures where the selected registry supports signed images. 7. Restrict or remove the `OPENLANE_IMAGE` override in automated or privileged contexts; otherwise validate it against an explicit allowlist. 8. Run downloaded components inside a disposable VM or sandbox without access to sensitive host files. 9. Use a trusted internal package mirror or container registry for reviewed artifacts. 10. Periodically update pinned versions through a controlled review process rather than relying on mutable tags. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (66)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents a broad orchestration skill for running an open-source EDA flow from specification through GDS and for creating/iterating/auditing AgentSkills. This code chunk does not perform those workflow-driving tasks. It only reads existing project/run/report files under a fixed workspace path and generates a multi-project HTML dashboard plus per-project detail pages. While the dashboard summarizes outputs from an EDA flow and links to generated artifacts like GDS, that is only a monitoring/reporting function, not the declared primary capability of driving the flow end to end. Therefore the description materially overstates and misrepresents this code chunk’s behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The declared description promises a broad workflow orchestration capability for AI-driven chip design, including turning specs into RTL/GDS and auditing AgentSkills. This code chunk does something much narrower and materially different: it hosts previously generated demo artifacts via a web server and refreshes summary files by invoking helper scripts. While report-summary generation is loosely related to EDA outputs, the primary behavior here is demo artifact serving over HTTP, with hardcoded paths to one example design. That network-serving capability and narrow purpose are not reflected in the declared description, so this is a meaningful description-behavior mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Docker Socket Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Mounting /var/run/docker.sock into a container gives code inside that container control over the host Docker daemon, which is effectively host-level access. In an AI-agent skill context, this is especially dangerous because any compromise or misuse inside the container can escape container isolation and manipulate the host.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 144)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Run OpenClaw inside Docker container with Docker socket mounted
docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
  -v ~/workspace:/workspace \
  your-openclaw-image

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 208)May include surrounding context.

md
sudo apt-get remove --purge yosys iverilog verilator gtkwave klayout docker.io

# Remove Python virtualenv
rm -rf ~/.venvs/openlane

# Remove Docker images
docker rmi efabless/openlane:latest

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 208)May include surrounding context.

md
sudo apt-get remove --purge yosys iverilog verilator gtkwave klayout docker.io

# Remove Python virtualenv
rm -rf ~/.venvs/openlane

# Remove Docker images
docker rmi efabless/openlane:latest

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 217)May include surrounding context.

sudo gpasswd -d $USER docker

Remove skill files

rm -rf /path/to/eda-spec2gds

text

Note: Removing Docker group membership requires logout/login to take effect.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 217)May include surrounding context.

sudo gpasswd -d $USER docker

Remove skill files

rm -rf /path/to/eda-spec2gds

text

Note: Removing Docker group membership requires logout/login to take effect.

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/generate_multi_project_dashboard.py (reported line 201)May include surrounding context.

python
grouped_stages = render_grouped_stages(data.get('progress', {}))
    artifacts = ''.join(f'<li><code>{html.escape(x)}</code></li>' for x in data.get('artifacts', {}).get('artifacts', [])[:120]) or '<li>-</li>'
    flow_tail = '\n'.join(data.get('progress', {}).get('tails', {}).get('flow.log', [])) or 'No flow log yet.'
    warn_tail = '\n'.join(data.get('progress', {}).get('tails', {}).get('warning.log', [])) or 'No warning log yet.'
    diagnosis = data.get('diagnosis', {})
    compare = data.get('run_compare', {})
    baseline = compare.get('baseline') or {}

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

The skill requests sensitive capabilities like sudo, Docker access, network use, and execution of shell-based scripts, but it does not declare a clear, enforceable tool scope such as allowed-tools for file and shell operations. That makes the operational boundary ambiguous and increases the chance an agent will execute broader commands than intended, especially when combined with installation and backend workflow steps.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly allows optional execution of a sudo-requiring installation script that modifies system packages, Python environments, and Docker group membership. Even though this is disclosed, sudo-capable scripted setup is inherently dangerous because it can alter host state, weaken isolation, and persist privileged access if run on a non-disposable system.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
permissions:
      - sudo_access  # Required only for initial toolchain installation
      - docker_group  # Required for OpenLane backend runs
    install_script: scripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh  # Optional, requires sudo
  warnings:
    - This skill includes optional installation scripts that modify system state (apt packages, Docker group, pip virtualenvs)
    - Run installation scripts only in isolated environments (VM, container, or development machine)

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

This section normalizes the use of sudo-backed setup scripts within the skill flow, which increases the likelihood that an agent or operator treats privileged execution as part of normal operation. In the context of a network-enabled, Docker-using EDA workflow, that expands the blast radius of any mistake or compromised dependency.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md
# eda-spec2gds Skill

> **⚠️ Security Notice:** This skill includes optional system installation scripts (`scripts/install_ubuntu_24_mvp.sh`, `scripts/bootstrap_eda_demo.sh`) that require sudo access and modify system state. These scripts should only be run in isolated development environments (VM, container, or dedicated workstation), not production systems. Core skill operations (RTL generation, file management, report collection) are file-based and safe.

Execute a staged, artifact-first open-source EDA flow within the workspace. Prefer deterministic scripts for execution, keeping the agent focused on planning, generation, diagnosis, and iteration.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Pulling efabless/openlane:latest is unsafe because the latest tag is mutable and may resolve to different images over time, including a compromised or unexpected build. In a workflow that may be run with Docker privileges and network access, this creates a serious supply-chain risk and undermines reproducibility.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

md
| Dashboard Serving | Local HTTP server on specified port | ✅ Safe |

These operations:
- Only read/write within the skill's project directories
- Do not require network access (except optional dashboard)
- Do not require elevated privileges
- Do not modify system configuration

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

md
- Only read/write within the skill's project directories
- Do not require network access (except optional dashboard)
- Do not require elevated privileges
- Do not modify system configuration

---

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

sudo systemctl enable --now docker enables and starts a persistent privileged service. In the context of this skill, that materially changes host state and broadens attack surface beyond simple file-based operations, especially because later guidance also involves Docker socket and group access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

md
sudo apt-get install yosys iverilog verilator gtkwave klayout docker.io python3-pip python3-venv

# Enables Docker service
sudo systemctl enable --now docker

# Adds user to Docker group (privilege escalation potential)
sudo usermod -aG docker $USER

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

systemctl enable --now docker introduces persistence by enabling a background service across reboots. While not malware-like persistence, it permanently changes host runtime behavior and expands exposure if the environment was expected to remain minimal or transient.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

md
sudo apt-get install yosys iverilog verilator gtkwave klayout docker.io python3-pip python3-venv

# Enables Docker service
sudo systemctl enable --now docker

# Adds user to Docker group (privilege escalation potential)
sudo usermod -aG docker $USER

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

sudo usermod -aG docker $USER grants the user effective root-equivalent access on many systems because Docker can be used to mount the host filesystem or start privileged containers. The document does mention this, but the command still represents a real privilege-escalation risk if followed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

md
sudo systemctl enable --now docker

# Adds user to Docker group (privilege escalation potential)
sudo usermod -aG docker $USER

# Creates Python virtual environment
python3 -m venv ~/.venvs/openlane

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs users to pull efabless/openlane:latest, which is a mutable tag and can change over time without notice. If users follow this guidance, they may receive a different image than expected, creating a supply-chain and reproducibility risk for a workflow that already has elevated trust requirements.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The plan explicitly includes a local HTTP server and exposing latest logs plus raw JSON, which can leak sensitive information such as filesystem paths, environment details, run metadata, proprietary design data, or credentials accidentally written to logs. In an EDA workflow, logs and generated artifacts often contain valuable IP and infrastructure details, so serving them without access controls, redaction, or user warnings creates a real information disclosure risk even if the server is only intended for local use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/demo-walkthrough.md (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

md
Demonstrate that the skill can manage a staged EDA flow:

1. Create a run directory
2. Save raw specification
3. Normalize specification
4. Place RTL and testbench

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ubuntu-24-setup.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
1. Install apt packages for synthesis/simulation/runtime
2. Enable Docker service
3. Create Python virtualenv for OpenLane
4. Pull Docker image for OpenLane
5. Run `scripts/check_env.sh` to verify
6. Perform smoke test with `assets/examples/simple-fifo/`

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

APT Package Installation

bash
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y \
  yosys \
  iverilog \

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 168)May include surrounding context.

APT Package Installation

bash
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y \
  yosys \
  iverilog \

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SECURITY.md (reported line 205)May include surrounding context.

APT Package Installation

bash
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y \
  yosys \
  iverilog \