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Security audit

Sovereign Commit Craft

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a markdown-only commit-writing skill with no hidden execution behavior; the main caution is its unpinned npx install example.

Install using a trusted or pinned ClawHub CLI version when possible, and review any generated shell commands before running them. Avoid pasting diffs that contain secrets unless you are comfortable sharing them with the agent using this skill.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:17
Finding
Unpinned Package Execution During Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `README.md`, lines 17–21 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party package execution **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code Snippet ```markdown ## Installation ```bash npx clawhub install sovereign-commit-craft ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions invoke `clawhub` through `npx` without specifying a package version or integrity value. If the CLI is not already available locally, `npx` may retrieve the current package release from the configured npm registry and execute it immediately. Because the dependency is mutable and unpinned, the code executed at installation time may differ from the version originally reviewed. This creates a supply-chain trust boundary around the npm package, its transitive dependencies, the configured registry, and the publisher account. The audit found no evidence that the referenced package is currently malicious. The risk arises from the unsafe installation pattern: a future compromised or unexpectedly changed release could execute arbitrary lifecycle or CLI code. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `clawhub` package publisher, registry distribution path, or a relevant dependency. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version that contains harmful CLI or lifecycle code. 3. A user follows the documented unversioned `npx` installation command. 4. `npx` resolves and downloads the mutable package release from the configured registry. 5. The downloaded package executes with the privileges of the user running the command. 6. The malicious code can access resources available to that account, subject to operating-system and environment restrictions. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. Depending on that account's privileges and environment, the attacker could potentially: - Read or modify files accessible to the user. - Access environment variables and locally a ...[truncated 374 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the reviewed CLI version explicitly: ```bash npx --yes clawhub@<reviewed-version> install sovereign-commit-craft ``` 2. Document the authoritative npm package name, publisher, registry, and expected version so users can detect dependency-confusion or package-substitution attempts. 3. Publish and verify package integrity metadata or cryptographic signatures where supported. Provide checksums through a separate trusted channel. 4. Recommend inspecting package metadata before execution: ```bash npm view clawhub@<reviewed-version> name version dist.integrity repository ``` 5. Prefer invoking a trusted, previously installed CLI whose provenance and version have already been verified. 6. Avoid running the installation command with administrative privileges. Use a restricted user account and isolate installation in a disposable environment when feasible. 7. Pin and audit transitive dependencies in the CLI distribution process, and use automated monitoring for publisher-account compromise and unexpected package changes.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Unbounded Resource Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
feat(api): add Redis-backed rate limiting to all API routes

The API had no protection against abuse or accidental traffic spikes.
A single client could overwhelm the server with unlimited requests,
degrading service for all users.

Add a configurable rate limiter using Redis sliding window counters.
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The README instructs users to run `npx clawhub install sovereign-commit-craft` without pinning a specific version of the `clawhub` package. `npx` will fetch the latest published package at execution time, so a compromised publisher account, dependency confusion event, or malicious future release could result in arbitrary code execution on the user's machine during installation. In a developer tooling context, this is more dangerous because users are likely to run the command directly in trusted local environments.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.