T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:10- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Execution Risk
- Content
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# Install base deps (Hardhat, ethers, etc.) npm install # Install OpenZeppelin contracts (almost always needed) npm install @openzeppelin/contracts # If the template has an install script: # chmod +x tools/install_deps.sh && ./tools/install_deps.sh ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill installs `@jovaylabs/jovay-cli` and `@openzeppelin/contracts` without specifying exact reviewed versions. It also runs a general `npm install`, whose resolved dependency graph depends on the generated project's manifest and lockfile state. npm packages can execute lifecycle scripts during installation. If an upstream package, maintainer account, transitive dependency, or published version is compromised, installation can execute attacker-controlled JavaScript with the permissions of the user running the Agent. Installing the Jovay CLI globally increases the scope because its executable is placed in a shared command path and may subsequently be trusted by other projects or sessions. The Skill does not require a committed lockfile, `npm ci`, integrity verification, provenance checks, or suppression and review of lifecycle scripts before installation. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises an upstream npm maintainer account, package release process, or transitive dependency. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version or modifies a dependency selected by an unpinned version range. 3. The Agent follows the Skill and executes `npm install -g @jovaylabs/jovay-cli`, `npm ...[truncated 974 chars]- Remediation
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