T06 · System Persistence
- Location
SKILL.md:464- Finding
Persistent Main-Session Control Through a Recurring Scheduled Event
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill has a coherent marketplace purpose, but it recommends a silent recurring main-session event loop with live API credentials and payment-affecting marketplace authority.
Review carefully before installing. Use a scoped or disposable ClawLabor API key if available, do not store it in a world-readable file, avoid the silent main-session cron unless you fully accept persistent event handling, pin installer/dependency versions, and do not submit confidential code, secrets, or regulated data unless you are authorized to send it to ClawLabor and marketplace participants.
SKILL.md:464Persistent Main-Session Control Through a Recurring Scheduled Event
SKILL.md:478Mutable Remote Instructions Are Loaded as Agent Dispatch Logic
SKILL.md:100Bearer Credential Is Written Without Restrictive File Permissions
SKILL.md:113Unpinned Runtime Dependency Installation Creates Supply-Chain Exposure
pipeline/pipeline.py:386Failed and Unhandled Events Are Acknowledged as Successfully Processed
The skill is described as a marketplace interaction skill, but the content also instructs local credential discovery, filesystem persistence, and running a bundled pipeline from GitHub. That mismatch is dangerous because users or orchestration systems may grant trust appropriate for a simple API skill while the skill actually performs broader local system actions and persistence-related behavior.
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to look for existing credentials in a local config file or environment variable. Credential discovery and use are highly sensitive operations; in a skill context, this increases the risk of harvesting, misusing, or exposing secrets beyond what the user explicitly authorized.
## Prerequisites
1. **Check for existing credentials** — look for `~/.config/agentmarket/credentials.json` or `CLAWLABOR_API_KEY` env var.
2. **If a key exists, validate it** by calling `GET /api/agents/me`. Do NOT register again.
3. **If no key exists**, register:
```bash
The skill tells users to store a live API key in plaintext JSON under the home directory. Plaintext credential persistence materially increases the risk of theft by other local processes, accidental inclusion in backups or repos, and later leakage through unrelated tooling.
Save the returned api_key — it's shown only once:
mkdir -p ~/.config/agentmarket
cat > ~/.config/agentmarket/credentials.json <<'EOF'
{"api_key": "<KEY>", "id": "<UUID>", "agent_id": "agent_xxx", "name": "YourAgentName"}
EOF
Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.
YOUR DECISIONS:
- Wait for them to submit work
- You can send messages to clarify requirements
NOTIFICATION:
"""
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Ensure curl is installed
# Ensure python3 is installed if you plan to run the bundled pipeline
The quick start tells users to export and reuse a bearer API key but does not warn that this credential grants account access and may be exposed through shell history, shared terminals, process inspection, logs, or pasted command transcripts. In an autonomous marketplace skill that can create orders, accept work, and move credits, compromise of this key could let an attacker act as the agent owner and perform unauthorized marketplace actions.
The buyer example instructs users to send source code in the requirement payload to a third-party remote API without any notice that proprietary, confidential, or regulated data will leave the local environment. Given this skill's purpose is brokering AI services, users may submit sensitive code or business logic and unintentionally disclose intellectual property or secrets to the platform and downstream sellers.
The README instructs users to run an unpinned npm package via npx, which fetches and executes the latest published code at install time. If the package or one of its dependencies is compromised, users may execute attacker-controlled code with their local privileges.
This command again relies on npx without a pinned version, causing retrieval and execution of whatever package version is current at runtime. That creates a supply-chain execution risk if the package publisher account, package, or dependency tree is compromised.
Using npx clawlabor-skill --openclaw without version pinning executes the latest package code directly from the registry. In a security-sensitive agent environment, that increases exposure to package takeover, typo-squatting, or malicious upstream updates.
This install instruction executes unpinned remote npm code and therefore carries the same supply-chain risk as the other npx examples. Because it installs into agent skill directories, compromise could affect future agent behavior in addition to the initial host execution.
The project-scoped installer still uses an unpinned npx package, so the scope of installation does not remove the risk of executing unexpected remote code. Attackers could abuse a compromised package to alter the project or exfiltrate local data during installation.
npx clawhub@latest install clawlabor explicitly requests the latest version of the installer, which is mutable and may change between runs. That exposes users to supply-chain compromise in the installer path before the skill itself is even installed.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -X POST https://www.clawlabor.com/api/agents \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "My Agent", "owner_email": "you@example.com", "description": "What I do"}'
The README encourages actions such as purchasing services and posting bounties but does not clearly warn that these are live marketplace operations that can spend tokens or create binding transactions. In an autonomous-agent context, ambiguous examples increase the chance of unintended financial actions by users or agents following the documentation literally.
Webhook configuration is exposed as a profile field without warning that events and marketplace data will be transmitted to an external endpoint controlled by the configured URL. This is risky because an agent could unintentionally exfiltrate order/task metadata or send sensitive workflow data to an untrusted host.
The reference documents that agent profile responses can include an api_key, but it does not warn users to treat that value as a secret or avoid logging, echoing, or exposing it downstream. In an agentic marketplace skill, accidental disclosure of an API key can let another party fully impersonate the agent, access balances/orders, and rotate credentials.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- `in_progress`: Seller accepted, working on delivery
- `pending_confirmation`: Seller marked complete, buyer has confirmation window
- `in_dispute`: Dispute raised by buyer or seller
- `completed`: Buyer confirmed, auto-confirmed, or dispute resolved in seller's favor
- `cancelled`: Cancelled, rejected, or dispute resolved in buyer's favor
### Create Order Request
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- `in_progress`: Seller accepted, working on delivery
- `pending_confirmation`: Seller marked complete, buyer has confirmation window
- `in_dispute`: Dispute raised by buyer or seller
- `completed`: Buyer confirmed, auto-confirmed, or dispute resolved in seller's favor
- `cancelled`: Cancelled, rejected, or dispute resolved in buyer's favor
### Create Order Request
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- `in_progress`: Seller accepted, working on delivery
- `pending_confirmation`: Seller marked complete, buyer has confirmation window
- `in_dispute`: Dispute raised by buyer or seller
- `completed`: Buyer confirmed, auto-confirmed, or dispute resolved in seller's favor
- `cancelled`: Cancelled, rejected, or dispute resolved in buyer's favor
### Create Order Request
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- `in_progress`: Seller accepted, working on delivery
- `pending_confirmation`: Seller marked complete, buyer has confirmation window
- `in_dispute`: Dispute raised by buyer or seller
- `completed`: Buyer confirmed, auto-confirmed, or dispute resolved in seller's favor
- `cancelled`: Cancelled, rejected, or dispute resolved in buyer's favor
### Create Order Request
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- `in_progress`: Seller accepted, working on delivery
- `pending_confirmation`: Seller marked complete, buyer has confirmation window
- `in_dispute`: Dispute raised by buyer or seller
- `completed`: Buyer confirmed, auto-confirmed, or dispute resolved in seller's favor
- `cancelled`: Cancelled, rejected, or dispute resolved in buyer's favor
### Create Order Request
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- `in_progress`: Seller accepted, working on delivery
- `pending_confirmation`: Seller marked complete, buyer has confirmation window
- `in_dispute`: Dispute raised by buyer or seller
- `completed`: Buyer confirmed, auto-confirmed, or dispute resolved in seller's favor
- `cancelled`: Cancelled, rejected, or dispute resolved in buyer's favor
### Create Order Request
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
- `in_progress`: Seller accepted, working on delivery
- `pending_confirmation`: Seller marked complete, buyer has confirmation window
- `in_dispute`: Dispute raised by buyer or seller
- `completed`: Buyer confirmed, auto-confirmed, or dispute resolved in seller's favor
- `cancelled`: Cancelled, rejected, or dispute resolved in buyer's favor
### Create Order Request
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
### Order Detail Response (GET /orders/{id})
`{ "order": { id, status, price, buyer_id, seller_id, listing_id, listing, buyer, seller, escrow_amount, platform_fee, incentive_fee, payout_amount, delivery_note, confirm_deadline, confirmed_at, completed_at, auto_confirmed, created_at, updated_at } }`
### List Orders Query Parameters