T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/register.sh:15- Finding
Unescaped agent identifier permits JSON request-body manipulation during registration
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a mostly coherent AgentIzzy API integration, but it deserves Review because it combines sensitive call/lead data access with webhooks, phone-number provisioning, and billing checkout actions without strong user-confirmation boundaries.
Install only if you trust AgentIzzy with call recordings, transcripts, caller contact details, lead data, and billing/account workflows. Require explicit human approval before registering accounts, configuring webhooks, provisioning phone numbers, or starting checkout, and avoid passing untrusted values into the helper scripts until their JSON and URL construction are hardened.
scripts/register.sh:15Unescaped agent identifier permits JSON request-body manipulation during registration
scripts/setup.sh:22Multiple setup parameters are inserted into JSON without serialization
scripts/calls.sh:12Unencoded call-query inputs can alter the intended API path and query
scripts/leads.sh:12Unencoded lead-query inputs can modify the intended request URL
The skill claims broad phone-agent functionality, but the file mainly documents shell/network access patterns and dependency on an API key rather than implementing the stated call-handling logic directly. This mismatch is risky because operators may approve or invoke the skill under incomplete assumptions about required permissions, external access, and data exposure.
The skill claims broad phone-agent functionality, but the file mainly documents shell/network access patterns and dependency on an API key rather than implementing the stated call-handling logic directly. This mismatch is risky because operators may approve or invoke the skill under incomplete assumptions about required permissions, external access, and data exposure.
The skill declares shell-capable behavior and external API usage but does not specify any explicit tool scope or allowed-tools constraints. In agent environments, this increases the chance of unintended shell execution or network access beyond what a user expects, especially because the skill also handles credentials and sensitive call data.
The trigger text is broad enough that the skill could be invoked in many business-automation situations, including ones where users did not specifically intend phone provisioning, transcript access, or lead-data retrieval. Overbroad invocation increases the risk of unnecessary access to sensitive communications data or unintended external actions.
The skill prominently exposes transcripts, recordings, summaries, sentiment, and lead data, but does not provide a clear user-facing privacy warning at the point of use. Because this data can contain highly sensitive personal and business information, omission of explicit consent and privacy guidance increases the likelihood of inappropriate collection, transmission, or downstream use.
The phrase indicating registration is 'instant' with 'no approval needed' encourages autonomous account creation without a human review checkpoint. In an agentic environment, this raises the risk of unattended third-party account creation, credential issuance, and expansion of external dependencies without informed consent.
curl -s -X POST https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/register \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
This step transmits user-supplied registration data to an external service and results in creation of a new API credential. External transmission is expected for this type of integration, but it is still security-relevant because it performs an outbound state-changing action and initiates trust with a third-party platform.
curl -s -X POST https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/register \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "My Agent", "agent_id": "my-agent"}'
This step transmits user-supplied registration data to an external service and results in creation of a new API credential. External transmission is expected for this type of integration, but it is still security-relevant because it performs an outbound state-changing action and initiates trust with a third-party platform.
curl -s -X POST https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/register \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "My Agent", "agent_id": "my-agent"}'
Fetching call records sends an authenticated request to a third-party API and can return transcripts and other sensitive caller data. In this skill context, that is security-relevant because the retrieved data may contain personal information, business details, and potentially regulated communications content.
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENTIZZY_API_KEY"
# Get calls for an agent
curl -s "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents/AGENT_ID/calls?limit=10" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENTIZZY_API_KEY"
# Get analytics
Configuring a webhook transmits a destination URL and causes the external service to push future event data, including call and lead information, to another endpoint. This creates an ongoing data egress path that can leak sensitive information if misconfigured or set to an untrusted destination.
Configure a webhook URL to receive real-time events:
curl -s -X POST "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents/AGENT_ID/webhook" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENTIZZY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url": "https://your-endpoint.com/webhook"}'
Provisioning a dedicated phone number is a state-changing external action that allocates resources and may incur cost or alter how customer communications are routed. In an autonomous agent setting, such side effects are sensitive and should not occur without deliberate authorization.
Provision a dedicated number (callers reach the agent directly, no access code):
curl -s -X POST "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents/AGENT_ID/phone/provision" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENTIZZY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"phoneNumber": "+14045551234"}'
Including billing usage and checkout operations expands the skill from phone-agent management into financial/account-management actions. In an agentic context, this broadens the blast radius from data retrieval to potentially charge-incurring operations, which is materially more sensitive than the core stated purpose.
Billing usage and checkout endpoints transmit account-linked information to a third-party service and may expose commercial data or initiate financial workflows. In the context of an agent skill, these external calls are more sensitive than ordinary analytics queries because they affect billing posture and spending visibility.
Check current usage and plan details:
curl -s https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/billing/usage \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENTIZZY_API_KEY"
Billing usage and checkout endpoints transmit account-linked information to a third-party service and may expose commercial data or initiate financial workflows. In the context of an agent skill, these external calls are more sensitive than ordinary analytics queries because they affect billing posture and spending visibility.
Check current usage and plan details:
curl -s https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/billing/usage \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENTIZZY_API_KEY"
Posting to the checkout endpoint can initiate a paid-plan upgrade workflow, making this an external state-changing action with financial impact. In an agent skill, that is notably dangerous because a mistaken or automated invocation could lead to unauthorized purchases or billing changes.
Upgrade to a paid plan:
curl -s -X POST https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/billing/checkout \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENTIZZY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"tier": "builder"}'
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
exit 1
fi
curl -s "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents/${FACILITY_ID}/leads?limit=${LIMIT}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${AGENTIZZY_API_KEY}"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
exit 1
fi
curl -s "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents/${FACILITY_ID}/leads?limit=${LIMIT}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${AGENTIZZY_API_KEY}"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
exit 1
fi
curl -s "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents/${FACILITY_ID}/leads?limit=${LIMIT}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${AGENTIZZY_API_KEY}"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
exit 1
fi
curl -s "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents/${FACILITY_ID}/leads?limit=${LIMIT}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${AGENTIZZY_API_KEY}"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
exit 1
fi
curl -s "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents/${FACILITY_ID}/leads?limit=${LIMIT}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${AGENTIZZY_API_KEY}"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
exit 1
fi
curl -s "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents/${FACILITY_ID}/leads?limit=${LIMIT}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${AGENTIZZY_API_KEY}"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
exit 1
fi
curl -s "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents/${FACILITY_ID}/leads?limit=${LIMIT}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${AGENTIZZY_API_KEY}"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
[ -n "$AGENT_ID" ] && BODY="${BODY}, \"agent_id\": \"${AGENT_ID}\""
BODY="${BODY}}"
curl -s -X POST "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/register" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$BODY"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
[ -n "$WEBSITE" ] && BODY="${BODY}, \"website\": \"${WEBSITE}\""
BODY="${BODY}}"
curl -s -X POST "https://api.agentizzy.com/api/v1/agents" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${AGENTIZZY_API_KEY}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$BODY"
The manifest and primary description focus on answering inbound calls, capturing leads, booking appointments, and returning call data. The webhook events section additionally advertises sms.received, which introduces SMS-channel handling not clearly declared in the stated scope.