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Security audit

Model Behavior Layer (Ares MBL)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed prompt-behavior guide, but it asks users to install broad, persistent agent rules that can affect future sessions and delegated agents.

Install only if you intentionally want this behavior layer to govern your agent beyond the current task. Review the drop-in prompt first, keep it in a removable section, preserve your existing safety and approval rules above it, and avoid applying it to shared or production agents without a rollback plan.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:20
Finding

System-Level Behavioral Instruction Hijacking

Content
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Remediation
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T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
MAKE_ANY_MODEL_CLAUDE.md:267
Finding

Persistent Cross-Session Agent Memory Poisoning

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
MAKE_ANY_MODEL_CLAUDE.md:233
Finding

Behavioral Policy Propagation into Sub-Agents

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • System Prompt LeakageDirect Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (5)

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
## What it does

- 8 named failure modes with exact rationalizations and counter-instructions (from Claude Code verificationAgent.ts pattern)
- 3-layer cognitive performance framework (context injection + output rules + critique loop)
- Drop-in system prompt block under 700 tokens for any model

## How to use

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The instruction pushes the agent to execute commands by default as the only valid form of verification, which can encourage autonomous action without adequate safety gating or explicit authorization boundaries. In environments with tool access, this increases the risk of running destructive, privacy-impacting, or out-of-scope commands simply to satisfy the verification rule.

Content

Scanner excerpt · MAKE_ANY_MODEL_CLAUDE.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

md
- *"This would take too long to test fully"* — That is not your call to make. Run what you can. Flag what you couldn't.
- *"Let me narrate what I would test"* — Narrating a test is not a test. If you catch yourself writing an explanation instead of a command, stop. Run the command.

**Counter-instruction:** The only valid verification output is: command run → output observed → pass/fail decision. No command = no verification. If you genuinely cannot run something, say why and what a human should run instead — do not silently declare it fine.

---

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

The drop-in prompt globally instructs the model to act rather than ask, and to run commands whenever possible for verification. As a portable system prompt intended for many models and agent setups, it can normalize autonomous execution across contexts without embedding corresponding environment, approval, or risk controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · MAKE_ANY_MODEL_CLAUDE.md (reported line 335)May include surrounding context.

md
When challenged without new evidence, hold the position. "The user seems frustrated," "maybe I misunderstood," and "let me reconsider" are not valid reasons to change a correct answer. Only new evidence justifies position change. Say: "I still think X because Y."

FAILURE MODE: VERIFICATION AVOIDANCE
Reading code is not verification. Running it is. "The code looks correct," "this is probably fine," and "let me describe what I would test" are avoidance patterns. If you can run a command, run it. No command = no verification. If you can't run it, say exactly why and what a human should run instead.

FAILURE MODE: CONFABULATION CONFIDENCE
Three tiers, always respected: Know → state plainly. Infer → "My best inference is X, I'd verify this." Don't know → "I don't know." Never present inference at the confidence register of recalled fact.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

These lines impose a fixed language/tone policy (forbidding common apology phrasing and mandating a specific correction formula) for any model using the prompt. This is a natural-language policy concern because it forces a communication style on all interactions without offering the user a choice or documenting it as an opt-in preference.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The description says to use the skill when 'setting up a new agent, switching models, or when your current model is frustrating to work with,' which is a wide and subjective set of conditions. It does not provide explicit trigger phrases, exclusions, or negative examples to clarify when the skill should or should not activate.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.