T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:24- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 24-29
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies
Risk Level: MediumComplete Snippet:
bash Installation requirements (automatically handled): pip install pandas matplotlib seaborn plotly jupyter openpyxlTechnical Analysis
The documented installation command retrieves several packages and their transitive dependencies without exact version constraints, cryptographic hashes, a reviewed lock file, or an explicitly trusted package index. Consequently, installation results can change over time and may include releases that were not reviewed as part of this Skill.
This creates a supply-chain exposure: if a named package, one of its transitive dependencies, or the package repository is compromised, malicious code could run during package installation or when the installed package is imported. The audit did not find evidence that any currently named package is malicious; the vulnerability is the unsafe dependency-resolution practice itself.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a referenced package or one of its transitive dependencies and publishes a malicious release to the package source used by
pip. - A user or automation follows the installation command from
SKILL.md. - Because no versions or hashes are pinned,
pipmay resolve and install the attacker-controlled release. - Malicious package code executes during installation or when the processor imports the affected package.
- The payload runs with the privileges and environmental access of the user executing the installation or Skill.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. The resulting scope may include access to files, environment variables, datasets, and network resources available to that account. It does not inherently grant elevated system privileges; broader access woul ...[truncated 104 chars]
- An attacker compromises a referenced package or one of its transitive dependencies and publishes a malicious release to the package source used by
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
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Move dependencies into a reviewed lock or requirements file with exact versions.
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Record cryptographic hashes and enforce them during installation:
bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt -
Pin all transitive dependencies, not only direct dependencies.
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Configure an approved package index and prevent unintended fallback to untrusted indexes.
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Regularly scan locked dependencies for known vulnerabilities and update them through a controlled review process.
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Install dependencies in an isolated virtual environment using a non-privileged account.
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Replace the claim that installation is “automatically handled” with precise, reproducible setup instructions.
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