Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected

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binance-square-skill

v1.0.0

Binance Square (币安广场) signal agent. Scrapes 200+ posts via Puppeteer + API interception, detects bot-pushed narratives, runs on-chain confirmation (OI/fundin...

0· 58·0 current·0 all-time
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
Capability signals
Crypto
These labels describe what authority the skill may exercise. They are separate from suspicious or malicious moderation verdicts.
VirusTotalVirusTotal
Suspicious
View report →
OpenClawOpenClaw
Benign
high confidence
Purpose & Capability
Name/description (scrape Binance Square, run Coinglass checks, optionally push to Telegram) match the declared requirements: Node to run the provided scripts, curl referenced for Coinglass calls, and TG env vars for Telegram pushes. No unrelated secrets or binaries are requested.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md instructs installing npm deps (puppeteer-core), running the provided Node scripts which intercept Binance Square API responses, perform local processing, write JSON/markdown reports under the skill directory, and optionally POST to Telegram or curl a user-provided Coinglass base URL. The instructions do not ask the agent to read unrelated system files or exfiltrate credentials beyond the declared env vars.
Install Mechanism
No automated install spec — user must run `npm install` to install puppeteer-core. This is expected for a Puppeteer-based scraper but pulls a sizable dependency and may require a compatible Node runtime and a matching Chrome/Chromium. No arbitrary remote binary downloads or obscure URLs are used by the skill itself.
Credentials
Required env vars (COINGLASS_BASE, TG_BOT_TOKEN, TG_CHAT_ID) are proportional to the claimed features: on-chain lookups and optional Telegram pushes. These are sensitive values but justified by the feature set. No additional unrelated credentials are requested.
Persistence & Privilege
Skill is not always-enabled and doesn't request system-wide privileges. It writes reports and JSON into its own skill directory (~/.claude/skills/binance-square/) and does not modify other skills or global agent config. Autonomous invocation is allowed (platform default) but not elevated by the skill.
Assessment
This skill appears coherent with its purpose, but review these practical safety points before running: - Review the included code (scrape-square.mjs and send-telegram.mjs) yourself — they are the only executable files and are readable (no obfuscated code was found). - COINGLASS_BASE: only provide an API base URL you trust. If you point this to a third-party proxy, that proxy will receive all coinglass queries and any API key you include there may be exposed. - Telegram creds: TG_BOT_TOKEN and TG_CHAT_ID are sensitive (bot token grants message-sending power). Only set them if you trust the skill and the host environment. Prefer creating a dedicated bot and chat for testing. - Network activity: the scraper launches Puppeteer and intercepts internal Binance API responses. This generates web traffic to Binance and to your COINGLASS_BASE and to api.telegram.org. If you need to limit exposure, run inside an isolated environment (container or VM) or inspect network traffic first. - Installation: npm install will pull puppeteer-core and its transitive deps. Ensure you run this in a controlled environment and have compatible Node/Chrome versions (or set CHROME_PATH). - Legal/ToS: scraping undocumented internal APIs may violate Binance terms of service; consider legal/compliance implications before automated runs. - Testing: use the provided test modes (e.g., send-telegram.mjs --test and smaller --scrolls values) to validate behavior before full runs. If you want extra caution: run the skill in a disposable container, avoid supplying long-lived or high-privilege credentials, and point COINGLASS_BASE to your own proxy that you control so you can audit requests.
scrape-square.mjs:63
Shell command execution detected (child_process).
scrape-square.mjs:34
Environment variable access combined with network send.
send-telegram.mjs:19
Environment variable access combined with network send.
!
send-telegram.mjs:17
File read combined with network send (possible exfiltration).
Patterns worth reviewing
These patterns may indicate risky behavior. Check the VirusTotal and OpenClaw results above for context-aware analysis before installing.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

Runtime requirements

Binsnode, curl
EnvCOINGLASS_BASE, TG_BOT_TOKEN, TG_CHAT_ID

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