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Security audit

Research Idea

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed business-idea research helper that uses background sessions, web search, local output files, and chat delivery in ways that fit its stated purpose.

Before installing, understand that saying `Idea: ...` starts a background research session, stores the submitted idea and generated report under `~/clawd/ideas/`, keeps the spawned session for later review, and sends results back through the chat. Avoid using highly confidential business ideas unless that storage and chat delivery are acceptable.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The README tells users to invoke the skill by saying "Idea: ..." but does not define whether that is the only accepted trigger, what variations are allowed, or what should not trigger it. It also defers to AGENTS.md for the actual trigger pattern, so this file's invocation guidance is incomplete and may lead to unintended or inconsistent activation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README states that research output is saved to '~/clawd/ideas//research.md' but does not warn users that their prompt contents and derived analysis will be persisted locally. Because business ideas may contain sensitive or proprietary information, silent local storage can create confidentiality and privacy risk, especially on shared systems or where home directories are backed up, synced, or monitored.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The manifest states the skill is rewritten to avoid external dependencies and to send results to the current chat, implying a Clawdbot-native workflow. However, the file repeatedly instructs sending files and summaries via Telegram chat, which reintroduces a platform-specific dependency and does not fully match the 'zero external dependencies' claim.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill causes user-supplied idea content and generated analysis to be written to local storage and sent back through chat, but it does not clearly warn users about this persistence and transmission. For potentially sensitive business ideas, this creates confidentiality and privacy risk because users may disclose proprietary information without understanding it will be stored on disk and redistributed through the messaging channel.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The prompt explicitly instructs the agent to create directories and write a research file under ~/clawd/ideas/{IDEA_SLUG}/research.md without indicating that this side effect must be disclosed to or confirmed by the user. In an agent setting, hidden filesystem writes can violate user expectations, create persistence, and become dangerous if the interpolated slug or surrounding workflow is later abused to overwrite unintended files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The manifest emphasizes that results are sent to the current chat, distinguishing this version from the earlier Telegram/Saved Messages flow. The quick-start text explicitly says results are sent back to 'this Telegram chat,' which conflicts with the stated intent that this is a native current-chat implementation rather than a Telegram-centric one.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.