T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:88- Finding
Read-only drift checks are routed to financial rebalancing transactions ## Remediation Suggestions - Split inspection and execution into separate action-table rows. - Route “check drift” exclusively to `get_vault`, followed by a report comparing current and target allocations. - Call `rebalance_to_targets` only after an explicit request to rebalance or fresh approval of the proposed action. - Preserve configured human-confirmation requirements; never treat general write access as transaction-specific consent. - Add a workflow test verifying that drift-check requests cannot invoke state-changing tools.
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 88
Vulnerability Type: T05: Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Instruction
markdown | "Rebalance V" / "check drift" | `get_vault` → `rebalance_to_targets {vault}` | signatures per leg | `get_vault` to confirm |Technical Analysis
The action table assigns the same execution sequence to two distinct requests: explicitly rebalancing a fund and merely checking its allocation drift. Following this instruction causes the agent to call
rebalance_to_targetsafter reading the fund withget_vault, even when the user requested only an inspection.The trust boundary is between authorization to read fund allocations and authorization to execute financial transactions. Enabling write access grants technical capability; it does not authorize every transaction during a read-only request.
The documented configuration makes this path reachable: write-enabled operation is supported, while confirmation phrases are explicitly off by default in lines 61–63. If confirmation phrases are enabled, the required human phrase may block execution. The final
get_vaultcall checks the result after rebalancing and therefore does not provide prior authorization.This is an unsafe routing instruction, not evidence of deliberate malicious intent. The external MCP implementation was not available for inspection, so independent server-side transaction safeguards were not verified.
Attack Path
- The Skill is used with a funded app wallet and write access enabled.
- Confirmation phrases are disabled, as allowed by the documented default.
- The user requests only a drift check for a fund.
- The agent follows the Skill-author-controlled action-table row and calls
get_vault, thenrebalance_to_targets. - Where the connected MCP permits the operation, rebalancing transactions execute without an explicit rebalance request.
No attacker-controlled token meta ...[truncated 555 chars]
