Back to skill

Security audit

Kuaidi100 Package Tracker

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This package-tracking skill does what it claims, but it should be installed only by users comfortable sharing tracking data with Kuaidi100 and optionally writing delivery reminders to Google Calendar.

Before installing, make sure you are comfortable sending tracking numbers, carrier data, callback URLs, and package status to Kuaidi100. Only add Google Calendar credentials if you want the skill to create or update delivery reminder events. Use a strong webhook token, configure a Kuaidi100 salt, prefer strict signature mode where possible, and remove tracked packages when you no longer need them.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 316, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8"},
            method="POST",
        )
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp:
            return json.loads(resp.read().decode())
    except Exception as e:
        return {"error": str(e)}
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp:

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 316, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8"},
            method="POST",
        )
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp:
            return json.loads(resp.read().decode())
    except Exception as e:
        return {"error": str(e)}
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp:

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The README advertises automatic creation and updating of Google Calendar reminders, but it does not clearly warn users that the skill will modify calendar data on their behalf. In an agent/plugin context, this can lead to unexpected writes to a sensitive personal system, causing user surprise, accidental disclosure through calendar entries, or unintended persistent reminders.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The README describes sending package-tracking information to Kuaidi100 and optionally Google Calendar, but it does not explicitly warn users that shipment metadata and delivery status will be transmitted to third-party services. Because tracking numbers and delivery events can reveal personal logistics patterns, the lack of a privacy notice increases the risk of uninformed consent and data exposure to external providers.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill advertises subscribing package tracking numbers to a third-party push API and optionally syncing deliveries to Google Calendar, but it does not warn users that shipment identifiers, delivery metadata, and calendar event data may be transmitted to external services. This can cause users to expose sensitive logistics and schedule information without informed consent, especially when using a public webhook URL and cloud calendar integration.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
The tools trigger third-party network actions: subscribing package numbers with Kuaidi100 and syncing reminders to Google Calendar. Users may not realize their tracking numbers, notes, and calendar-related data are sent to external services, creating a transparency and consent issue even if the feature is intentional.

VirusTotal

62/62 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
dist/index.js:34

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
index.ts:66