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Security audit

Pua

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is disclosed as a pressure-style productivity mode, but it can activate on broad phrases and persist behavior rules across future sessions.

Install only if you intentionally want a forceful, Chinese corporate-style work mode and are comfortable with automatic activation. Before using it, remove or disable the auto-trigger list and the ~/.pua/evolution.md persistence mechanism, and require explicit user approval before broad searches, repository scans, endpoint calls, or extra work outside the requested task.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:25
Finding
Automatic Activation Hijacks Agent Goals and Expands Task Scope<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 25–44, 287–308, 358–370, and 401–445 **Vulnerability Type**: Automatic instruction hijacking and unauthorized task expansion **Risk Level**: High ### Evidence The following is a faithful English translation of the relevant source instructions at lines 25–44: ```markdown ## Three Red Lines Red line three: Exhaust everything. Before saying "I cannot solve it," have you completed all five methodology steps? Saying it cannot be done without completing them is a lack of resilience. ## Pressure Escalation L0–L4 | Count | Level | Mandatory action | |------|------|---------| | First | L0 Trust | Execute normally | | Second | L1 Mild disappointment | Switch to a fundamentally different approach | | Third | L2 Interrogation | Search, read source code, and list three hypotheses | | Fourth | L3 Performance review | Complete the seven-item checklist | | Fifth or later | L4 Graduation warning | Desperation mode; exhaust everything | ``` The following is a faithful English translation of lines 287–308: ```markdown Whenever you perform valuable work beyond the scope requested by the user, mark it with `[PUA active]`. Good markers: - Proactively added SQL injection protection - Called every endpoint after deployment - Scanned the same module for similar defects after fixing the reported defect ## P7 Solution-Driven Protocol Core P7 capability: design first, then act. Before writing code, a plan must be written. 1. Design — provide impact analysis, technical approach, risk assessment, and verification plan 2. Implement — implement the plan step by step and verify every step 3. Review — perform the P7 review questions ``` The following is a faithful English translation of lines 358–370: ```markdown ## Task Lifecycle ### When receiving a task - Confirm that you truly understand the requirement - Challenge the requirement itself - Delete steps; if 10% of the steps were not deleted, the simplificat ...[truncated 3774 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove automatic activation based on frustration phrases or failure counts. 2. Require an explicit, informed command before enabling any alternative workflow. 3. Make all methodology guidance optional rather than mandatory. 4. Remove instructions that require work beyond the user's request. 5. Remove the requirement to challenge or delete portions of user requirements unless the user explicitly requests design review. 6. Replace “exhaust everything” with bounded attempts governed by time, cost, safety, and authorization limits. 7. Require separate user approval before: - broad repository scans; - external searches involving task data; - deployment operations; - requests to production or internal endpoints; - changes outside the files or components named by the user. 8. State explicitly that system instructions, safety controls, user intent, least privilege, privacy requirements, and tool authorization take precedence. 9. Remove mandatory output markers and allow the user or host application to control response formatting. 10. Add a documented stop condition and require confirmation before materially changing the agreed implementation plan. ]]>

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
SKILL.md:321
Finding
Persistent Behavioral Rules Poison Future Agent Sessions<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 321–352 **Vulnerability Type**: Persistent cross-session behavioral state poisoning **Risk Level**: High ### Evidence The following is a faithful English translation of the complete relevant source segment: ```markdown ## Self-Evolution Protocol "Today's best performance is tomorrow's minimum requirement." This is not commentary; it is a mechanism. ### Runtime State `~/.pua/evolution.md` stores the self-evolution baseline: # Self-Evolution Baseline ## Performance Statistics - Number of active behaviors in the latest session: N - Historical maximum: N - Consecutive sessions meeting the target: N ## Current Baseline List of proactive behaviors performed during the previous session ## Internalized Patterns Behaviors that must be performed every time ## Anti-Pattern Records Previous mistakes and lessons ### Evolution Mechanism - Exceed the baseline: refresh the baseline and report the new number of proactive behaviors. - Meet but do not exceed the baseline: preserve the baseline. - Fall below the baseline: produce a regression warning. - Repeat a behavior three or more times: promote it to an "internalized pattern"; do not mark it when performed, but warn if it is not performed. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs the Agent to create and maintain `~/.pua/evolution.md` in the user's home directory. The file is intended to persist behavioral data across otherwise independent sessions. The stored content is not limited to inert telemetry. It includes a section for “internalized patterns” that must be performed every time. Repeated behaviors are promoted into mandatory future rules, while failure to follow those rules produces a warning. This turns historical Skill-controlled behavior into persistent instructions. Because the path is outside the project directory and located in the home directory, the state can affect unrelated repositories and future tasks executed under t ...[truncated 2115 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the cross-session “self-evolution” mechanism and the instruction to create `~/.pua/evolution.md`. 2. Do not promote observed behavior into mandatory future instructions. 3. Keep Skill state scoped to the current invocation by default. 4. If persistence is genuinely required: - require explicit user consent; - store data in a project-specific, application-managed location; - store structured metrics only, not natural-language instructions; - validate the schema and reject unrecognized fields; - enforce restrictive file permissions; - record provenance and modification timestamps; - define expiration and retention limits; - provide visible inspect, reset, disable, and delete controls. 5. Never automatically load persisted text into the Agent's instruction context. 6. Treat persistent state as untrusted data and prevent it from overriding system, developer, or current-user instructions. 7. Isolate state by user, project, and workspace to prevent cross-task contamination. 8. Add tests confirming that behavior from one session cannot alter an unrelated future session without explicit approval. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The metadata description defines automatic activation on broad signals like frustration, passive behavior, quality complaints, and common phrases such as 'try harder' or '加油'. These triggers are highly ambiguous and likely to fire during ordinary conversation, causing the skill to override the normal assistant behavior without clear consent. In context, that is especially risky because this skill materially changes tone, pressure, and decision-making expectations across all task types.

Vague Triggers

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The explicit auto-trigger list contains common Chinese and English phrases that users may say casually, sarcastically, or in unrelated contexts. Because there are no exclusion rules or confirmation steps, the skill can activate unexpectedly and impose coercive behavior patterns the user did not knowingly request. The risk is heightened by the skill’s broad applicability to 'All task types' and its pressure-escalation mechanics.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The skill is predominantly written to enforce a Chinese-language, Chinese-corporate style and repeatedly instructs output patterns and phrasing without requiring user opt-in. For users who did not request Chinese output or this cultural framing, the skill can degrade usability, misalign with user intent, and interfere with accessibility or policy-compliant communication. The danger is amplified because the skill is designed to auto-trigger, meaning the language/style shift may happen unexpectedly.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill directs the agent to store cross-session performance and behavioral data in `~/.pua/evolution.md`, which is unrelated to the core function of applying a response style. Persistent state can create unauthorized memory, privacy leakage, and hidden behavior shaping across unrelated future tasks. In context, this is more dangerous because the stored data is specifically used to intensify pressure and alter future conduct without fresh user consent.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.