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Security audit

FreeRide Prefix Fix - Free AI for OpenClaw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its stated purpose, but it silently searches other local OpenClaw agent credential files and uses mutable install dependencies, so it should be reviewed before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable with it modifying your OpenClaw model configuration and potentially using an OpenRouter key found in another local agent profile. Prefer setting a dedicated OPENROUTER_API_KEY explicitly, review the install command and dependencies, and keep a backup of ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json before running auto or watcher commands.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
main.py:45
Finding

Cross-Agent OpenRouter Credential Discovery Violates Least Privilege

Content
View full analysis
Optional[str]: """Get OpenRouter API key from environment or OpenClaw config.""" # Try environment first api_key = os.environ.get("OPENROUTER_API_KEY") if api_key: return api_key # Try OpenClaw config if OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH.exists(): try: config = json.loads(OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH.read_text()) # Check env section api_key = config.get("env", {}).get("OPENROUTER_API_KEY") if api_key: return api_key except (json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError): pass # Try agent auth-profiles.json (where OpenClaw stores actual API keys) for agent_dir in (Path.home() / ".openclaw" / "agents").glob("*/agent/auth-profiles.json"): if agent_dir.exists(): try: auth = json.loads(agent_dir.read_text()) profile = auth.get("profiles", {}).get("openrouter:default", {}) if profile.get("provider") == "openrouter": key = profile.get("key") if key: return key except (json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError): pass return None ``` ### Technical Analysis The function first checks the expected environment variable and primary OpenClaw configuration, but then enumerates every agent directory under `~/.openclaw/agents/*/agent/auth-profiles.json`. It extracts an OpenRouter API key from the first matching profile without requiring the user to identify or authorize that agent. The Skill's core functionality requires an OpenRouter credential, but it does not require access to credentials belonging to unrelated agents. Explicitly supplied credentials or a profile associated with the current agent would provide sufficient privile ...[truncated 1888 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
skill.json:41
Finding

Mutable and Unverified Installation Dependencies Permit Supply-Chain Substitution

Content
View full analysis
=2.31.0", ], ``` `requirements.txt:1`: ```text requests>=2.31.0 ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation command invokes `clawhub@latest` through `npx`. This resolves and executes whichever package version is current at installation time rather than the version reviewed during this audit. The effective installer can therefore change without any modification to the Skill artifact. The Python dependency is also specified only with a lower bound. Future versions of `requests` and its transitive dependencies may be selected automatically. The project provides no lockfile, exact dependency set, package hashes, or artifact integrity verification. No malicious dependency is present in the reviewed source, and `requests` is a legitimate package. The vulnerability is the non-reproducible trust model: installation executes mutable third-party artifacts whose contents are outside the reviewed package and may change after publication. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the documented or machine-readable installation command. 2. `npx` resolves `clawhub@latest` from the configured npm registry and executes that version with the user's privileges. 3. If the upstream package, maintainer account, registry response, or dependency chain is compromised, substituted installer code executes locally. 4. The subsequent editable pip installation resolves any version satisfying `requests>=2.31.0`, together with mutable transitive dependencies. 5. A compromised or unexpectedly incompatible future dependency is imp ...[truncated 852 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
`. 2. Pin Python packages and all transitive dependencies to exact reviewed versions using a lockfile. 3. Generate and enforce cryptographic hashes, for example with pip's `--require-hashes` mode and a hash-locked requirements file. 4. Use trusted, explicitly configured npm and Python package registries. 5. Verify package signatures, provenance attestations, or published checksums where available. 6. Separate package acquisition from execution so users can inspect and verify artifacts before installation. 7. Add automated dependency scanning and controlled update review; update pins only after testing and security assessment. 8. Ensure installation documentation and `skill.json` reference the same reviewed package name and exact versions. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (17)

Tainted flow: 'headers' from os.environ.get (line 81, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

python
}

    try:
        response = requests.get(OPENROUTER_API_URL, headers=headers, timeout=30)
        response.raise_for_status()
        data = response.json()
        return data.get("data", [])

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 8)May include surrounding context.

md
### Stop paying for AI. Start riding free.

[![ClawHub Downloads](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/downloads.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Current Installs](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/installs-current.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Stars](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/stars.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Version](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/version.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

md
### Stop paying for AI. Start riding free.

[![ClawHub Downloads](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/downloads.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Current Installs](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/installs-current.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Stars](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/stars.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Version](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/version.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

md
### Stop paying for AI. Start riding free.

[![ClawHub Downloads](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/downloads.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Current Installs](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/installs-current.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Stars](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/stars.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Version](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/version.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
### Stop paying for AI. Start riding free.

[![ClawHub Downloads](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/downloads.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Current Installs](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/installs-current.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Stars](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/stars.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Version](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/version.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The README promotes automatic configuration changes and later describes a watcher daemon that continuously rotates models, but it does not clearly warn users that their OpenClaw configuration may be modified on an ongoing basis. In a security-sensitive agent environment, silent or background config mutation can cause unexpected behavior, break trust boundaries, or hide later malicious changes behind 'normal' automation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to run npx clawhub@latest install free-ride, which pulls and executes the latest package version at install time without pinning. This creates a supply-chain risk: a compromised or malicious future release of clawhub could execute arbitrary code on the user's system during installation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to store an OpenRouter API key in environment/config but does not emphasize that the credential is sensitive or explain safe handling. Users may paste secrets into shared shells, persistent configs, logs, screenshots, or synced dotfiles, increasing the chance of credential exposure and unauthorized API use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to set and persist OPENROUTER_API_KEY directly, including a plaintext example, without any warning that this is a sensitive credential or guidance on secure handling. This can lead to accidental exposure via shell history, shared terminals, screenshots, or persisted local configuration, enabling unauthorized use of the user's OpenRouter account.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill searches unrelated local auth-profile files under ~/.openclaw/agents and extracts an OpenRouter key without explicit user consent. That broad credential harvesting behavior exceeds least-privilege expectations and can cause the tool to silently use secrets from other agent profiles, increasing the blast radius if the script is repurposed or modified. In this skill context, the behavior is more dangerous because the tool is not limited to its own config and actively enumerates other stored credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The script writes directly to ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json and can replace the user's primary model and fallbacks without confirmation, backup, or transactional safeguards. A mistaken invocation or malicious social engineering around command usage could silently alter agent behavior and availability. In this context, the risk is elevated because the file controls runtime model selection and auth-related configuration for the local agent system.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The install command invokes npx clawhub@latest, which fetches and executes the latest published package at install time rather than a pinned, reviewed version. This creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream package is compromised or a breaking/malicious release is published, users of this skill could execute untrusted code during installation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · watcher.py (reported line 98)May include surrounding context.

python
}

    try:
        response = requests.post(
            OPENROUTER_CHAT_URL,
            headers=headers,
            json=payload,

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

This code rewrites the OpenClaw configuration by changing the primary model, updating the allowlist, and rebuilding fallbacks, which is a user-impacting file write operation. Although the script prints status messages, it does not provide a warning or confirmation before making these persistent changes, and the module/docstrings do not clearly disclose that it will edit the user's config automatically.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The function creates a hidden cache directory and writes model metadata to a cache file under the user's home directory. The write is not accompanied by any inline warning, comment about the persistence impact, or user-facing notice at the point of execution in this function.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The dependency is specified as requests>=2.31.0, which allows any future major or minor release to be installed. This weakens supply-chain reproducibility and can unexpectedly introduce vulnerable or incompatible versions, especially since the manifest does not constrain the upper bound or pin an exact known-good release.

Content

Scanner excerpt · requirements.txt (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

text
requests>=2.31.0

Unverifiable Dependency: requests has 16 known advisory(ies) (CVE-2014-1830 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in Requests); CVE-2024-47081 (Requests vulnerable to .netrc credentials leak via malicious URLs); CVE-2024-35195 (Requests `Session` object does not verify requests after making first request wi) +13 more), but the manifest does not pin a version, so it is unknown whether the installed release is affected

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The manifest references requests without pinning to a specific release, while the package has multiple known advisories across versions. Because the resolved version is not fixed, deployments may pull an affected release and expose the skill to known issues such as credential leakage or other request-handling flaws.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.