T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:35- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Container Image Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 35-42
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party executable dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet:
bash create-nim-interactive \ tgcr.turing-agi.com/public/qwen/qwen3.5-4b-spark-nim:latest \ qwen3.5-4b-nim \ 18000 \ Qwen/Qwen3.5-4B \ 0.88Technical Analysis
The documented example instructs users to execute a container image obtained from
tgcr.turing-agi.comusing the mutablelatesttag. A mutable tag does not provide an immutable association with the image that was originally reviewed or tested. The registry owner—or an attacker who compromises the registry, repository, publisher account, or release process—can replace the image referenced by this tag.The project does not pin the image to a content digest, document image-signature verification, or provide provenance information. Consequently, the effective executable content can change without any corresponding modification to this repository.
The repository contains only
SKILL.md; the referencedcreate-nim-interactiveimplementation and generated Docker scripts are absent. The audit therefore cannot determine which volumes, devices, capabilities, environment variables, or network permissions would be granted to the container.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the external registry, image repository, publisher credentials, or image build pipeline.
- The attacker publishes a malicious image under the existing
qwen3.5-4b-spark-nim:latesttag. - A user follows the documented workflow and invokes
create-nim-interactive. - The generated startup workflow pulls or runs the image currently associated with the mutable tag.
- Attacker-controlled code executes inside the container with all resources and permissions granted by the unreviewed startup script.
- Depending on those grants, the malicious image may access mounted files, GPU de ...[truncated 870 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the mutable tag with an immutable digest, for example:
bash trusted-registry.example/model/image@sha256:EXPECTED_DIGEST - Prefer an authenticated, verified official NVIDIA NGC source or another explicitly trusted registry.
- Verify image signatures and provenance before execution, using mechanisms such as Cosign, Notary, or registry-native trust policies.
- Publish the expected digest and signature identity in the documentation and enforce verification in the generated startup script.
- Run the container with least privilege: avoid
--privileged, the Docker socket, host namespaces, unnecessary capabilities, and broad writable host mounts. - Use a non-root container user, a read-only root filesystem, capability dropping, restricted networking, and explicit resource/device grants where compatible.
- Include the
create-nim-interactiveimplementation and generated-script templates in the project so command construction, shell quoting, container deletion behavior, mounts, environment variables, and Docker privileges can be audited. - Add automated image vulnerability scanning and a controlled process for reviewing and updating pinned digests.
- Replace the mutable tag with an immutable digest, for example:
