Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Kubernetes management skill needs review because its examples insufficiently scope secret transfers and production cluster changes.
Start with narrowly scoped, read-only cluster access. Before allowing changes, verify the exact cluster, namespace, resource, and intended operation. Authorize individual secrets and trusted destinations before transfer, protect saved kubeconfigs, and keep secret values out of responses and logs. See [Kubernetes Secrets guidance](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/secrets-good-practices/). The artifacts support operational review concerns, without evidence of malicious intent.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
## Understanding Contexts
A kubeconfig context combines:
- **Cluster**: API server URL and CA certificate
- **User**: Authentication credentials
- **Namespace**: Default namespace (optional)
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
## Best Practices
1. **Naming Convention**: Use descriptive context names (`prod-us-east-1`, `staging-eu-west-1`)
2. **Access Control**: Different kubeconfigs per environment
3. **Always Specify Context**: Avoid accidental cross-cluster operations
4. **Cluster Groups**: Organize by purpose (`prod-*`, `staging-*`, `dev-*`)
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
list_contexts()
kubeconfig_view()
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# List CAPI-managed clusters
capi_list_clusters(namespace="capi-system")
# Get workload cluster kubeconfig
kubeconfig = capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(
name="workload-cluster-1",
namespace="capi-system"
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
list_contexts()
kubeconfig_view()
## Context in Every Command
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
capi_list_clusters(namespace="capi-system")
# Get workload cluster kubeconfig
kubeconfig = capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(
name="workload-cluster-1",
namespace="capi-system"
)
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
capi_list_clusters(namespace="capi-system")
# Get workload cluster kubeconfig
kubeconfig = capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(
name="workload-cluster-1",
namespace="capi-system"
)
The example reads secrets from one cluster and proposes applying them to another without verifying destination authorization, trust boundaries, or which secrets may be transferred. Although cross-cluster synchronization is legitimate for this skill, following this pattern could expose source credentials to destination administrators or workloads, potentially enabling access back to source systems.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Different files per environment
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Different files per environment
export KUBECONFIG=~/.kube/production.yaml
export KUBECONFIG=~/.kube/development.yaml
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Different files per environment
export KUBECONFIG=~/.kube/production.yaml
export KUBECONFIG=~/.kube/development.yaml
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
namespace="capi-system" )
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| List contexts | `list_contexts` | `list_contexts()` |
| View kubeconfig | `kubeconfig_view` | `kubeconfig_view()` |
| List CAPI clusters | `capi_list_clusters` | `capi_list_clusters(namespace)` |
| Get CAPI kubeconfig | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig` | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(name, namespace)` |
## Context Management
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| List contexts | `list_contexts` | `list_contexts()` |
| View kubeconfig | `kubeconfig_view` | `kubeconfig_view()` |
| List CAPI clusters | `capi_list_clusters` | `capi_list_clusters(namespace)` |
| Get CAPI kubeconfig | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig` | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(name, namespace)` |
## Context Management
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| List contexts | `list_contexts` | `list_contexts()` |
| View kubeconfig | `kubeconfig_view` | `kubeconfig_view()` |
| List CAPI clusters | `capi_list_clusters` | `capi_list_clusters(namespace)` |
| Get CAPI kubeconfig | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig` | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(name, namespace)` |
## Context Management
The supplied call targets application-level GitOps resources, a capability not identified in the description. Selecting a fixed Kubernetes context does not itself constitute context switching or multi-cluster management. No surrounding workflow is supplied that would establish this application listing as a supporting step for the declared purpose.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| Task | Tool | Example |
|------|------|---------|
| List contexts | `list_contexts` | `list_contexts()` |
| View kubeconfig | `kubeconfig_view` | `kubeconfig_view()` |
| List CAPI clusters | `capi_list_clusters` | `capi_list_clusters(namespace)` |
| Get CAPI kubeconfig | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig` | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(name, namespace)` |
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| Task | Tool | Example |
|------|------|---------|
| List contexts | `list_contexts` | `list_contexts()` |
| View kubeconfig | `kubeconfig_view` | `kubeconfig_view()` |
| List CAPI clusters | `capi_list_clusters` | `capi_list_clusters(namespace)` |
| Get CAPI kubeconfig | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig` | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(name, namespace)` |
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| Task | Tool | Example |
|------|------|---------|
| List contexts | `list_contexts` | `list_contexts()` |
| View kubeconfig | `kubeconfig_view` | `kubeconfig_view()` |
| List CAPI clusters | `capi_list_clusters` | `capi_list_clusters(namespace)` |
| Get CAPI kubeconfig | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig` | `capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(name, namespace)` |
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
kubeconfig_view()
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
capi_get_cluster(name="prod-cluster", namespace="capi-system")
### Get Workload Cluster Kubeconfig
```python
capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(name="prod-cluster", namespace="capi-system")
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
capi_get_cluster_kubeconfig(name="prod-cluster", namespace="capi-system")
The secret synchronization example reads secrets from one cluster and applies a secret manifest to another without requiring selection of specific secrets or verification of the destination trust boundary. If followed with real credentials, it could expose production access to a less-trusted cluster and its administrators; this is a conditional disclosure risk, not evidence of intentional exfiltration.
The activation list treats mentioning "cluster" or "context" as sufficient without requiring Kubernetes or multi-cluster intent. These terms also occur in unrelated requests, and the list provides no exclusion conditions.
Missing warnings alone would not establish a vulnerability, but the production-named scaling example also omits an explicit management-cluster context despite the skill's own context-safety rule. Executing it against an unintended current context could resize the wrong machine deployment, while production installation and GitOps synchronization examples lack explicit target-verification and approval gates.
No suspicious patterns detected.