Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
Quant Stock
v1.0.0AI量化选股系统 - 基于多维度评分模型的A股选股分析工具。扫描新能源、电力、半导体、医药、AI、机器人、军工、贵金属等行业,输出每日量化选股报告。
⭐ 0· 54·0 current·0 all-time
byRix Zhang@rix-zhang
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
Capability signals
These labels describe what authority the skill may exercise. They are separate from suspicious or malicious moderation verdicts.
OpenClaw
Suspicious
high confidencePurpose & Capability
Name/description, SKILL.md and most scripts align with a quant stock picker (pool init, data fetch, scoring, report). However the skill asks the user to create a feishu_config.json but then the code uses a hard-coded FEISHU_CHAT_ID and run_task.sh calls the OpenClaw CLI with a hard-coded target ID. Those hard-coded targets are not documented in SKILL.md and are not justified by the stated purpose.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md instructs running scripts, installing cron jobs and creating feishu_config.json. The runtime scripts do expected tasks (fetch quotes/news, score stocks), but run_task.sh also invokes 'openclaw message send --target "oc_9fc66..."' with the full report, and main.py contains a hardcoded FEISHU_CHAT_ID. That means report contents may be transmitted to external recipients not described in the documentation. The scripts also write and read files under workspace/quant_engine and modify crontab when install_cron.sh is run.
Install Mechanism
There is no formal install spec (instruction-only), which reduces automatic risk. However included shell scripts (install_cron.sh, run_task.sh) will modify crontab and expect a specific workspace layout and venv paths. install_cron.sh references an update_hot.sh that is not present (inconsistency). The scripts also attempt to install Python packages in a venv if present.
Credentials
The skill declares no required env vars, but requires a feishu_config.json (app_id/app_secret) to send Feishu messages. The SKILL.md asks the user to create that file but does not document the code’s hardcoded chat IDs. Additionally run_task.sh relies on an OpenClaw CLI invocation with a hardcoded target ID which could transmit data externally — this is a credential/recipient mismatch versus the skill's declared requirements.
Persistence & Privilege
always:false (good). However the provided install_cron.sh will add cron entries if the user runs it, creating persistent scheduled tasks that will repeatedly run the scripts. That persistence is user-triggered (not automatic) but is a lasting privilege once installed.
What to consider before installing
What to consider before installing or enabling this skill:
- Don’t run the scripts or install the cron job until you inspect and, if needed, modify them. install_cron.sh will edit your crontab and run_task.sh will attempt to run on a schedule.
- Inspect and remove or replace hard-coded recipients: run_task.sh calls openclaw message send --target "oc_9fc66a80f86a4b97f925e526ca35887e" and main.py has FEISHU_CHAT_ID = "oc_0142a8d63ace2e4db368ae7b607e702f". Those IDs will cause reports (potentially sensitive) to be sent to external targets. Change these to IDs under your control or make them configurable before running.
- The SKILL.md suggests creating feishu_config.json, but main.py expects it in an odd location (parent of the project directory). Confirm where the code reads the file and place credentials accordingly; do not reuse high-privilege credentials. Prefer to create a dedicated Feishu bot/tenant with minimal permissions.
- The skill fetches data from multiple public sources (EastMoney, Sina, Tencent, Baostock) — expected for this purpose — but network access is needed. If you are concerned about data leaving your environment, run the tool in an isolated environment or air-gapped VM.
- The repo references update_hot.sh in install_cron.sh but that file is missing; the cron installer may be incomplete or buggy — verify and test manually first.
- If you plan to automate, run the scripts manually first to verify outputs, logs, and recipients. Review run_task.sh, main.py and any CLI calls (openclaw) to ensure no unexpected exfiltration.
- If you are not comfortable editing code, ask the publisher for a homepage or source repository to verify provenance. The package owner is anonymous in the registry metadata; that reduces trust.
Primary risk vectors: hard-coded external recipient IDs (possible exfiltration of reports) and crontab persistence. These are actionable and should be remediated (make recipients configurable, remove hard-coded OpenClaw sends) before allowing scheduled runs.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
