Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a coherent Capgo live-update guide with disclosed external service use and automation, but users should apply normal release-governance and supply-chain precautions.
Install this only if you are intentionally adding Capgo OTA updates to a Capacitor app. Before using the CI examples, pin CLI and container versions, protect CAPGO_TOKEN, test through beta or staged channels, keep release changelogs and approval controls, and confirm that your update practices comply with app-store and user-consent expectations.
The skill promotes automatic live updates and explicitly highlights skipping app store review, but it does not clearly warn that user-facing behavior can change without explicit user consent or strong governance. In the context of OTA code delivery, this can enable unsafe rollout practices, policy violations, or trust-eroding changes that are harder for users and reviewers to detect.
The 'When to Use This Skill' section includes broad triggers such as 'User wants live/OTA updates' and 'User needs to push hotfixes quickly,' which could match many general app-update conversations. The file does not provide negative examples or scope constraints to clarify when this Capgo-specific skill should not be invoked.
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
autoUpdate: true,
// Update behavior
resetWhenUpdate: true, // Reset to built-in on native update
updateUrl: 'https://api.capgo.app/updates', // Default
statsUrl: 'https://api.capgo.app/stats', // Analytics
// Channels
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
autoUpdate: true,
// Update behavior
resetWhenUpdate: true, // Reset to built-in on native update
updateUrl: 'https://api.capgo.app/updates', // Default
statsUrl: 'https://api.capgo.app/stats', // Analytics
// Channels
Using npx @capgo/cli bundle upload without a pinned version can fetch and execute the latest published package at runtime in CI. If the package is compromised, typo-squatted, or unexpectedly changed, the build pipeline could execute attacker-controlled code with access to repository contents and deployment secrets such as CAPGO_TOKEN.
This GitLab CI example also uses npx @capgo/cli bundle upload without version pinning, creating the same runtime package-fetch risk in an automated deployment environment. CI runners typically hold tokens and source code, so a malicious or altered upstream package could exfiltrate secrets or tamper with release artifacts.
The self-hosting example runs capgo/capgo-server without a tag or digest, which pulls a mutable image reference. This can silently change over time or be replaced upstream, exposing deployers to supply-chain compromise and making builds non-reproducible.
The trigger list contains broad phrases such as 'live updates', 'ota updates', 'skip app store', and 'hotfix' that can match many generic software-deployment requests without clearly requiring Capgo-specific intent. This can cause the skill to activate in situations where users did not ask for this tool specifically, increasing the chance of inappropriate guidance around bypassing normal app-store distribution controls.
The manifest frames this skill as a guide for implementing Capgo live updates in Capacitor apps, covering account setup, plugin installation, configuration, update strategies, and CI/CD. The self-hosted section goes beyond app integration and instructs users to run backend infrastructure with Docker and database configuration, which is a separate operational capability not clearly justified by the stated purpose.
No suspicious patterns detected.