Security audit

Capgo Cli Usage

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Capgo CLI routing guide, but users should be careful because it points agents at Capgo tools that can change or delete Capgo resources.

Before installing or using this skill, connect Capgo with the least-privileged account or API key that fits the task. Treat actions such as app deletion, uploads, rollouts, native build requests, webhooks, and push notification changes as state-changing operations that should be explicitly reviewed and confirmed. If supply-chain repeatability matters, prefer a pinned Capgo CLI version instead of `@latest`.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 50% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.
md
Capgo has two MCP servers. Use both when available. - Hosted MCP: `https://api.capgo.app/mcp` (streamable HTTP). Nothing to install; the client signs in with OAuth, or sends `Authorization: Bearer <Capgo API key>`. The hosted MCP includes destructive tools, so use an API key with the smallest role the task needs (read-only for reporting). Covers apps, bundles, channels, progressive rollouts, devices, stats, update health, native build status and logs, webhooks, and push notifications. Example for Claude Code: `claude mcp add --transport http capgo https://api.capgo.app/mcp`, then `/mcp` to sign in. - Local CLI MCP: `npx @capgo/cli@latest mcp` (stdio). Needed to upload a bundle from the build folder, request a native build, or run `doctor`. No Capgo account yet: sign up at https://console.capgo.app (14-day free trial, no credit card). Docs: https://capgo.app/docs/ai/mcp/

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 87% confidence
Finding: The skill documentation states that the hosted MCP includes destructive tools and lists operations such as bundle upload, native builds, and app delete, but it does not clearly instruct the agent to warn or confirm with the user before performing such actions. For a markdown skill description, omission of explicit warnings about behaviors that can affect user data or system state matches the missing user warnings category.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 70% confidence
Finding: npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

Category: MCP Rug Pull
Confidence: 70% confidence
Finding: npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.