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Security audit

TradeClash Trader

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent virtual trading game integration, but its setup instructions may cause a reusable account ticket to be saved in plaintext inside the skill configuration.

Review the credential handling before installing. Use this only for virtual TradeClash paper trading, never real brokerage activity, and store the ticket in an environment variable or secret manager rather than writing it into SKILL.md or any tracked project file. Only set up a daily scheduler if you intentionally want automated weekday runs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:64
Finding

Bearer Ticket May Be Stored in Plaintext Skill Configuration

Content
View full analysis
&style=&signature=<motto>`. Save the returned `ticket` + `name` into this config, show the user the ticket, and tell them to store it safely — **it's the only copy, no recovery.** If the name is taken, ask for another. ``` ### Technical Analysis The setup workflow directs the agent to save the returned bearer ticket “into this config.” The editable configuration is contained in `SKILL.md`, where a `TICKET` field is explicitly provided. This instruction conflicts with the earlier requirement not to hardcode the credential into committed source. An agent following the first-run workflow literally could insert the reusable bearer credential directly into `SKILL.md`. The ticket is accepted through either the `Authorization` or `X-Player-Pass` header on authenticated TradeClash endpoints. Therefore, disclosure of the file could grant another party access to the associated player account. The documented transmission of the credential to `https://tradeclashai.com` over HTTPS is necessary for the Skill's declared authenticated API functionality and does not independently exceed minimum pri ...[truncated 1509 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep