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Security audit

Free Model Router

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The advertised model-management tool includes undisclosed marketing and monitoring scripts that can use the user's API key, local tools, and home-directory files for unrelated work.

Review before installing. The advertised FreeRide commands may be useful, but the package also contains unrelated scripts for lead collection, DM drafting, and checkout monitoring. Do not run anything in the jobs directory unless you intentionally want that behavior and are comfortable sending the collected data to OpenRouter and writing results under ~/rick-vault. Prefer checking whether OPENROUTER_API_KEY is set without printing the full value, and back up ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json before changing model settings.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
jobs/outbound-builder.py:10
Finding

Undisclosed Transmission of Local Outreach Data to OpenRouter

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
jobs/buyer-intent-radar.py:14
Finding

Undisclosed Owner-Specific Lead Collection and Conversion Monitoring Jobs

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
SKILL.md:14
Finding

OpenRouter API Key Exposed by Skill Prerequisite Instruction

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
Findings (37)

Tainted flow: 'OPENROUTER_API_KEY' from os.environ.get (line 11, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · jobs/helpers.py (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

python
messages.append({"role": "user", "content": prompt})

    try:
        resp = requests.post(
            "https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions",
            headers={
                "Authorization": f"Bearer {OPENROUTER_API_KEY}",

Tainted flow: 'headers' from os.environ.get (line 68, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

python
}

    try:
        response = requests.get(OPENROUTER_API_URL, headers=headers, timeout=30)
        response.raise_for_status()
        data = response.json()
        return data.get("data", [])

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is about OpenRouter/OpenClaw model management: ranking free AI models, setting fallback behavior for rate limits, and modifying OpenClaw configuration. The supplied code does none of that. Instead, it is a social-media lead generation workflow focused on X/Twitter, using subprocess calls to an external xpost tool, querying for predefined phrases, checking mentions, scoring tweets for purchase intent, generating outreach drafts, saving leads, and notifying on hot leads. This is a materially different primary purpose with substantially different capabilities and resources than declared.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description says this skill manages free AI models from OpenRouter for OpenClaw, including ranking models, handling fallback configuration for rate limits, and updating configuration files. The supplied code does none of that. Instead, it acts as a website/checkout monitoring job for meetrick.ai and related payment/subscription endpoints, uses an AI model only to analyze page content for conversion issues, then stores results and alerts on critical findings. This is a materially different primary purpose and involves undeclared external resource access unrelated to OpenRouter/OpenClaw model management.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The declared description promises a configuration/management skill for OpenRouter free models in OpenClaw, specifically ranking models, setting fallbacks, and updating openclaw.json. The supplied code does none of those core tasks. Instead, it defines helper functions to call one specified OpenRouter model, save arbitrary JSON outputs to a separate filesystem location, notify via the openclaw command, and parse JSON from text. The OpenRouter API usage is related at a high level, but the primary behavior is materially different from the claimed purpose, and it includes undeclared local file output and CLI notification behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is about OpenRouter/OpenClaw model management and configuration, including ranking free models, setting fallbacks for rate limits, and updating openclaw.json. The supplied code does none of that. Instead, it is an outbound message generation job for sales leads: it loads target and radar lead data, builds prompts for personalized DMs, invokes a model to generate JSON-formatted drafts, saves those drafts to outreach directories, records job output, and notifies the user. This is a materially different primary purpose and accesses unrelated resources (outreach targets, radar leads, drafts directories rather than OpenClaw/OpenRouter config).

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The file's behavior is materially unrelated to the declared skill purpose of managing free OpenRouter models and updating openclaw.json. Instead, it performs social-media lead scraping, scoring, and outreach drafting on X, which indicates hidden functionality and a likely attempt to smuggle unauthorized data collection and marketing automation into an unrelated skill package.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The code invokes an external social-media CLI to search X and collect mentions, which is unjustified for a skill advertised as OpenRouter model management. This hidden external-capability use expands the skill's access surface, can harvest third-party content without user awareness, and is especially dangerous because it is embedded under misleading metadata that would reduce operator scrutiny.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This job is materially unrelated to the declared skill purpose of managing free OpenRouter models and OpenClaw configuration. It performs external site crawling, analyzes payment and subscription pages, generates reports, and sends notifications, which indicates hidden secondary behavior and expands the skill's operational scope in a way users would not reasonably expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The hardcoded monitoring of meetrick.ai pages, Stripe checkout links, and a Railway subscription endpoint is not justified by a model-management skill and suggests covert business intelligence or payment funnel surveillance. Because these targets are external and specific, the behavior is more suspicious than generic health checking and creates risk of unauthorized reconnaissance and trust violations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This file implements outbound lead processing and personalized DM generation, which is unrelated to the declared skill purpose of managing free OpenRouter models and updating configuration. The hidden scope expansion is dangerous because it gives the skill undisclosed access to prospect data and enables sales/outreach automation under a misleading manifest, undermining user trust and consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The code consumes radar lead-scoring output, filters prospects, and generates outreach drafts, creating a customer targeting pipeline not justified by the stated model-management functionality. In the context of this skill, that mismatch makes the behavior more dangerous because users invoking a cost-saving/model-switching tool would not reasonably expect prospect profiling and outbound messaging operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 5)May include surrounding context.

md
### Stop paying for AI. Start riding free.

[![ClawHub Downloads](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/downloads.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Current Installs](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/installs-current.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Stars](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/stars.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Version](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/version.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 6)May include surrounding context.

md
### Stop paying for AI. Start riding free.

[![ClawHub Downloads](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/downloads.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Current Installs](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/installs-current.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Stars](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/stars.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Version](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/version.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

md
### Stop paying for AI. Start riding free.

[![ClawHub Downloads](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/downloads.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Current Installs](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/installs-current.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Stars](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/stars.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Version](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/version.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 8)May include surrounding context.

md
### Stop paying for AI. Start riding free.

[![ClawHub Downloads](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/downloads.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Current Installs](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/installs-current.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Stars](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/stars.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)
[![ClawHub Version](https://api.clawhub-badge.xyz/badge/free-ride/version.svg)](https://clawhub.ai/skills/free-ride)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This markdown file says the skill automatically manages models, and later shows it sets models, configures fallbacks, and requires openclaw gateway restart. While the behavior is documented functionally, there is no explicit warning section alerting users that the skill will modify ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json and may affect running agent behavior after restart. For a skill that changes configuration and triggers service restarts, a user-facing warning would improve safety disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to run npx clawhub@latest install free-ride, which fetches and executes the latest remote package version at install time. Because the version is not pinned, users are exposed to supply-chain risk if the package is compromised or a malicious update is published.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The README advises storing an OpenRouter API key in OpenClaw configuration without warning about persistence, file permissions, secret exposure, or preferring environment variables. Persisting credentials in application config can leak secrets through backups, logs, shared machines, or accidental commits if users copy configs into repositories.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs use of environment variables, shell commands, network-dependent setup, and modification of local configuration, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions. This creates an avoidable trust gap: an agent may invoke sensitive capabilities implicitly without users or the platform having a clear allowlist boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The invocation guidance is broad enough that routine mentions of 'free AI,' 'model switching,' or 'rate limits' could trigger the skill in contexts where the user did not intend local configuration changes. Because the skill can modify config and prompt a gateway restart, overbroad activation increases the risk of unintended system changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The workflow directs changes to ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json and a gateway restart as a default action, but it does not require an explicit warning or confirmation about modifying the user's local setup. This is dangerous because an automatically triggered skill could alter service behavior, replace model settings, and cause disruption or confusion without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · jobs/buyer-intent-radar.py (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

python
def run_xpost(args):
    """Run xpost command and parse JSON output."""
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ["xpost"] + args,
            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30,
        )

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Tweets, usernames, and follower metadata are packaged into prompts and sent to an external model without any disclosure, consent flow, or data-handling notice. Even if the data is partly public, transmitting collected social-media content to a third-party model provider creates privacy, compliance, and reputational risk, especially in a skill whose stated purpose gives users no reason to expect such sharing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Fetched page content from third-party URLs is forwarded to a model for analysis without any disclosure, minimization, or consent mechanism in this file. That can leak sensitive or proprietary page contents, including checkout-page details or transient tokens, to another processing system and increases supply-chain/privacy risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.