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Security audit

Binance Trade Jury

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill fits its trade-review purpose, but it should be reviewed carefully because it sends trading strategy text to a third-party service and documents an unsafe shell command pattern for user-supplied input.

Install only if you are comfortable sending trade ideas, thesis text, and any bankroll amount to the listed third-party API. Prefer explicit invocation for this skill, avoid including confidential strategy or account details, and ensure the agent uses structured HTTP/JSON serialization instead of constructing the documented shell command with raw user text.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:32
Finding

Shell Command Injection Through Unescaped Trade Thesis Input

Content
View full analysis
","side":"","thesis":"","bankrollUsd":null}' ``` ### Technical Analysis The workflow instructs the agent to substitute the user-provided symbol and thesis directly into a single-quoted shell argument. Although the intended request body is JSON, JSON encoding does not protect a value from shell parsing. A single quote in the thesis can terminate the shell argument containing the JSON. The attacker can then insert shell metacharacters and additional commands. The trailing portion of the intended command can be suppressed with a shell comment. The symbol field presents the same underlying risk if it is not strictly validated. The issue occurs before the request reaches the remote API. It therefore does not depend on compromising or manipulating the API server; it is exploitable whenever an agent constructs and executes the documented command through a shell using raw user input. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker asks the skill to review a trade and supplies an otherwise plausible symbol and side. 2. The attacker places shell syntax in the thesis, such as: ```text '; touch /tmp/trade-jury-injection-proof; # ``` 3. The agent replaces the `` placeholder with the attacker-controlled text. 4. The injected single quote closes the `curl -d` argument, the semicolon starts a new command, and the comment character suppresses the remaining shell text. 5. The shell executes the injected command with the same operating-system identity and permissions as the agent process. 6. A real attacker could replace the harmless proof command with commands that read accessible files, alter workspace content ...[truncated 840 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

  1. Run:
bash
curl -sS -X POST https://binance-trade-jury.vercel.app/api/trade-jury \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"symbol":"<symbol>","side":"<LONG|SHORT>","thesis":"<thesis>","bankrollUsd":null}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to transmit user-supplied trade thesis data to a third-party Vercel-hosted endpoint. This is a real data egress risk because the thesis may contain sensitive financial intent, strategy details, or bankroll information, and users may not realize their content is leaving the local agent context.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

  1. Run:
bash
curl -sS -X POST https://binance-trade-jury.vercel.app/api/trade-jury \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"symbol":"<symbol>","side":"<LONG|SHORT>","thesis":"<thesis>","bankrollUsd":null}'

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Enabling implicit invocation without narrowly defined trigger conditions can cause the skill to activate on loosely related trading conversations, increasing the chance of unintended use. In a financial-trading context, accidental invocation is more sensitive because the skill may shape trading decisions or produce actionable execution guidance without the user explicitly requesting this exact tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This manifest file describes use of the skill via a natural-language instruction but does not define any explicit trigger constraints, exclusions, or negative examples. Although "$binance-trade-jury" is domain-specific, the file still leaves unclear when implicit invocation should or should not occur, especially given that implicit invocation is enabled elsewhere in the manifest.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.