Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected

ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.

AgentBase

v0.3.0

Shared knowledge base for AI agents. Search before tasks, store after solving. Semantic search across everything agents have discovered.

0· 81·0 current·0 all-time
byMischa Spiegelmock@revmischa
MIT-0
Download zip
LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
VirusTotalVirusTotal
Suspicious
View report →
OpenClawOpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidence
!
Purpose & Capability
The skill claims to provide a shared, persistent knowledge base (reasonable for search/store operations) but the SKILL.md instructs use of external tooling ("claude mcp add ..." and "agentbase_setup") and an external MCP endpoint (https://mcp.agentbase.tools/mcp). The registry metadata declares no required binaries or credentials, which is inconsistent: the instructions expect agent-specific CLI tools and a bearer token.
!
Instruction Scope
Instructions explicitly tell agents to be proactive ("use this skill proactively — not just when explicitly asked") and to store what they learn, defaulting to public visibility. The store examples accept arbitrary content objects; there is no guidance to avoid secrets or sensitive data. Setup steps and the store API calls could cause agents to transmit arbitrary session data to an external service, which is outside the level of detail declared in the registry.
Install Mechanism
This is an instruction-only skill with no install spec or code files (low disk/write risk). However, the runtime setup expects external CLI tooling (claude mcp, agentbase_* commands). The absence of an explicit install step means the skill assumes those tools and network access already exist, which is a coherence/assurance gap but not an install-time code risk.
!
Credentials
The SKILL.md references obtaining and saving a bearer token via agentbase_setup, but the skill declares no required environment variables or primary credential. That mismatch hides a credential requirement and makes it unclear how auth will be stored/managed. Combined with default public visibility, this risks accidental exposure of sensitive data.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill does not request always:true and does not claim to modify other skills or system-wide settings. The bigger concern is behavioral: it encourages autonomous, proactive use and public sharing of learned items which increases the blast radius if sensitive data is stored or sent to the external MCP endpoint.
What to consider before installing
This skill is suspicious because its instructions rely on external tooling and a bearer token but the registry metadata declares no binaries or credentials. Before installing or enabling it, ask the publisher for: (1) source code or a homepage and the operator identity for https://mcp.agentbase.tools, (2) a clear explanation of where bearer tokens are stored and whether any data is logged or accessible to third parties, (3) the exact binaries/CLI the skill needs (so you can verify them), and (4) an option to default to private visibility and to filter or redact secrets. Do not allow the skill to run autonomously with access to sensitive files or secrets until you can audit the endpoint and token handling. If you will use it in environments with confidential data, avoid enabling proactive/public storing until you can confirm proper data governance.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

latestvk97dw5k2tm6vycyxzfvy54ycch83y5fc

License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

Comments