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Security audit

Reputation courts practice search

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed paid reputation.ru court-research integration that uses an API key and sends legal queries to that service, with no hidden or unrelated behavior found.

Install only if you intend to use the paid reputation.ru service and accept that court queries, case IDs, document requests, and an API key or OAuth authorization will be used for that service. Prefer OAuth or a scoped/revocable API key, monitor billing for search and analysis calls, and do not point REPUTATION_BASE_URL at any endpoint you do not trust.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (7)

MCP Config Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Content
| **Account sign-in (OAuth)** | the client supports OAuth for MCP **and** a person is at the keyboard | the user, in a browser |
| **API key** | any client, headless runs, REST, CI | you, with a key the user supplies |

MCP config lives in `.claude/mcp.json`, `~/.cursor/mcp.json`, the Claude Desktop
config, or your runtime's equivalent. Restart the client after editing it.

### 1a. MCP with account sign-in (OAuth)
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
**You cannot complete this flow yourself.** It needs a person in a browser. If you are
running non-interactively, stop and say so: ask the user to authorize the server in their
client (Claude Code: `/mcp`; Cursor: MCP settings), then retry. **Never ask the user to
paste an authorization code, access token, or callback URL to you**, and never try to
drive the consent page yourself.

**Do not add `headers.Authorization` to an OAuth config.** Most clients skip the sign-in
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
**You cannot complete this flow yourself.** It needs a person in a browser. If you are
running non-interactively, stop and say so: ask the user to authorize the server in their
client (Claude Code: `/mcp`; Cursor: MCP settings), then retry. **Never ask the user to
paste an authorization code, access token, or callback URL to you**, and never try to
drive the consent page yourself.

**Do not add `headers.Authorization` to an OAuth config.** Most clients skip the sign-in
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Ae4

Medium
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "reputation-court-search": {
      "url": "https://api.reputation.ru/mcp"
    }
  }
}
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "reputation-court-search": {
      "url": "https://api.reputation.ru/mcp"
    }
  }
}
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
**You cannot complete this flow yourself.** It needs a person in a browser. If you are
running non-interactively, stop and say so: ask the user to authorize the server in their
client (Claude Code: `/mcp`; Cursor: MCP settings), then retry. **Never ask the user to
paste an authorization code, access token, or callback URL to you**, and never try to
drive the consent page yourself.
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.