Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md | HMAC, mTLS, or composite auth | Custom auth/plugin | `custom-auth-plugin.md` |
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent CLI-building guide that discusses installs, credentials, and writes openly with safety boundaries rather than hiding execution.
Before using it, be comfortable with an agent modifying CLI projects, running package-manager/test commands, and generating auth or installer flows. Review any generated global install or npx-based install command, and do not paste production credentials into chat.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| HMAC, mTLS, or composite auth | Custom auth/plugin | `custom-auth-plugin.md` |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| HMAC, mTLS, or composite auth | Custom auth/plugin | `custom-auth-plugin.md` |
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- `scope` ← `scope`
- `token_endpoint_auth_method` ← `client_secret_basic`
So the common case writes `scope` exactly once; pass explicit `clientMetadata.scope` only when registration declares a different set than authorization. Access tokens are always Bearer (RFC 6750); `x-api-key`/`basic` styles belong to custom plugins via `injectAuthHeader`.
The factory takes no directory or store parameter — the local state arrives via `apply(services)` from `defineCliApp({ dir })`. Use `createMemoryLocalState` with `defineCliApp({ localState })` in tests.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
### 4. Enforce trust boundaries
- Never place passwords, private keys, or long-lived tokens in source, examples, logs, snapshots, or command arguments. Do not ask users to provide production credentials; registration must be completed in their own terminal, with the current unmasked-input limitation disclosed.
- Never log complete headers, authentication responses, or response bodies that may contain sensitive data. Redact diagnostic output.
- Disclose installation, global writes, login, network calls, and data mutations before acting; obtain approval when required.
- For writes, declare preview, confirmation, and idempotency through `policy`; do not hide execution-safety flags inside the business Zod object.
The documentation recommends npx skills add without pinning a package version, which can cause execution of an unexpected or newly published package version at install time. In an agent-driven or automated environment, this increases supply-chain risk because the invoked code is fetched and executed dynamically.
Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.
Key `defineCliApp` options:
| Option | Rule |
| --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `dir` | The app's one local-state root (`dir` XOR `localState`; injected via `apply(services)`) |
| `name` | Output `source`, pipe type, and Skill identity |
The file instructs authors to put 'natural-language triggers' and only the 'nearest exclusion' into the description, which can encourage ambiguous activation criteria for generated skills. Because it explicitly says not to repeat a complete trigger table elsewhere, authors may omit the specificity and negative examples needed to prevent accidental invocation.
The guidance recommends running npx skills add <url> without pinning a package/version, which can execute whatever package currently resolves from the registry at install time. In an installation workflow that may create global packages, Skill files, configuration, and credentials, this introduces a supply-chain execution risk and makes compromise of the package name, publisher, or dependency chain materially dangerous.
Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.
A production Skill must pass all five TRACE dimensions:
| Dimension | Question | Standard |
| ------------- | ------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Trust | Can it be used safely? | No hidden side effects, sensitive-data leaks, unsupported claims, or undisclosed dependencies |
| Reliability | Does it work consistently? | Commands, fields, edge cases, and recovery match the implementation |
The natural-language instruction includes a concrete locale flag example, --lang zh, as part of the default skill-generation workflow. Because the file does not state that language selection should be based on user preference or opt-in, this can be read as endorsing a forced locale choice, which risks violating language/locale policy expectations.
Line L038 contains a code comment written in Chinese in an otherwise English document and code sample. This imposes a language-specific instruction without offering user choice or documenting a locale-specific reason, which matches the language/locale policy violation category.