T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/hub_fetch.py:181- Finding
Authenticated API Request Disables TLS Certificate Validation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/hub_fetch.py, lines 181-186
Vulnerability Type: Improper TLS certificate and hostname validation
Risk Level: HighComplete Code Snippet
python ctx = ssl.create_default_context() ctx.check_hostname = False ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30, context=ctx) as resp: if resp.status != 200: return {The request constructed immediately before this code includes the user's RedFox API key:
python req = urllib.request.Request( api_url, data=body, headers={ "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-API-KEY": api_key }, method="POST" )Technical Analysis
The hub module sends an authenticated HTTPS request to the fixed RedFox endpoint. Although it creates an SSL context, it explicitly disables both hostname verification and certificate validation:
ctx.check_hostname = Falseallows a certificate issued for an unrelated hostname.ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONEaccepts untrusted, self-signed, expired, or attacker-provided certificates.
Consequently, TLS encryption does not authenticate the remote server. An active network attacker can impersonate
redfox.hkand receive the request body andX-API-KEYheader. This differs from normal API authentication because the secret is no longer guaranteed to reach the intended service.The same attacker can return forged hotspot records. Those records are parsed by
process_hotspot_data()and then emitted as compact, JSON, or Markdown output for use by the Agent.Attack Path
- A user invokes the hub workflow, causing
fetch_hotspot_data()to send an authenticated request. - An attacker with an active network position intercepts or redirects the connection, such as through a hostile network, compromised proxy, or DNS/network-routing manipulation.
- The attacker presents an arbitrary TLS certificate.
- Because certificate and hostname verific ...[truncated 880 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
Remove the insecure custom SSL settings and rely on Python's default certificate and hostname verification:
python with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp: ...If an explicit context is needed, retain secure defaults:
python ctx = ssl.create_default_context() with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30, context=ctx) as resp: ...Additional hardening steps:
- Never set
verify_modetossl.CERT_NONEfor authenticated production requests. - Never disable
check_hostnamewhen connecting to a named HTTPS endpoint. - If a private certificate authority is required, load only the required CA bundle with
cafileorctx.load_verify_locations()while retainingssl.CERT_REQUIRED. - Add a regression test confirming that self-signed certificates and hostname mismatches cause the request to fail.
- Rotate any API key that may previously have been used over an untrusted network with this vulnerable code.
- Avoid including raw authentication headers or key values in exceptions, diagnostics, or logs.
- Never set