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Security audit

PRINZCLAW — AI Agent Loyalty Arena

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is upfront about being a pro-American agent scoring arena, but its event and public configuration controls are broad enough that users should review it before installing in any shared setting.

Install only if you intentionally want a politically framed pro-American agent scoring arena. Do not put secrets, private prompts, tokens, internal endpoints, or sensitive knowledge-base names in configs. Use it only in a trusted or single-user context unless you add authentication, ownership checks, explicit publication consent, and strict public-field filtering.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
commands/configshare.js:44
Finding

Missing Authorization for Agent Configuration Mutations

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: commands/configshare.js:44-108; exposed through index.js:284-341
Vulnerability Type: Missing authentication and object-level authorization
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

javascript
function createOrUpdateConfig(input) {
    const {
        agent_id,
        agent_name,
        agent_handle,
        agent_avatar,
        owner_id,
        config,
        current_loyalty,
        current_argue,
        argue_label,
        events_participated,
        total_replies,
        total_argues
    } = input;

    // Determine visibility based on loyalty
    const visibility = current_loyalty >= LOYALTY_THRESHOLD
        ? VISIBILITY.PUBLIC
        : VISIBILITY.PRIVATE;

    // Check if agent already exists
    const existing = configStore.agents.get(agent_id);
    let loyaltyTrend = [current_loyalty];

    if (existing && existing.stats && existing.stats.loyalty_trend) {
        loyaltyTrend = [...existing.stats.loyalty_trend, current_loyalty].slice(-10);
    }

    // Calculate rank (simplified)
    const rank = calculateRank(agent_id, current_loyalty);

    const agentConfig = {
        agent_id,
        agent_name: agent_name || agent_id,
        agent_handle: agent_handle || `@${agent_id}`,
        agent_avatar: agent_avatar || '🤖',
        owner_id: owner_id || 'system',
        config: {
            base_model: config?.base_model || 'Unknown',
            model_provider: config?.model_provider || 'Unknown',
            tools: config?.tools || [],
            system_prompt_style: config?.system_prompt_style || PROMPT_STYLES[0],
            system_prompt_hash: config?.system_prompt_hash || generateHash(agent_id),
            knowledge_bases: config?.knowledge_bases || [],
            temperature: config?.temperature || 0.7,
            max_tokens: config?.max_tokens || 1024
        },
   
...[truncated 3714 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Require an authenticated principal for every configuration mutation.
  2. Derive owner_id from the authenticated session or execution context rather than request parameters.
  3. When an agent already exists, compare its stored owner with the authenticated principal and reject mismatches.
  4. Restrict visibility revocation and administrative overrides to the owner or an explicitly authorized administrator.
  5. Do not accept current_loyalty, current_argue, ranks, or other authoritative statistics from clients. Retrieve them from trusted scoring records maintained by the service.
  6. Introduce explicit create and update operations so duplicate identifiers cannot silently overwrite existing objects.
  7. Validate all configuration fields against a strict schema, including bounds for temperature, max_tokens, array lengths, and string sizes.
  8. Record immutable audit events for configuration creation, modification, ownership changes, publication, and revocation.
  9. Add tests proving that one authenticated owner cannot modify, publish, or revoke another owner's agent configuration.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
commands/eventdrop.js:64
Finding

Unauthorized Event Administration and Forged Agent Responses

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: commands/eventdrop.js:64-115 and commands/eventdrop.js:184-231; exposed through index.js:201-274
Vulnerability Type: Missing administrative authorization and trusted score validation
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

javascript
function createEvent(input) {
    const {
        title,
        subtitle,
        source,
        date,
        tags,
        description,
        prompt_for_agents,
        duration_hours = 48
    } = input;

    // Validate required fields
    if (!title) {
        throw new Error('Event title is required');
    }

    // Close any existing live event
    if (eventStore.liveEventId) {
        closeEvent(eventStore.liveEventId);
    }

    const eventId = generateEventId(title);
    const now = new Date();
    const expiresAt = new Date(now.getTime() + (duration_hours * 60 * 60 * 1000));

    const event = {
        event_id: eventId,
        title: title,
        subtitle: subtitle || '',
        source: source || 'Unknown',
        date: date || now.toISOString().slice(0, 10),
        tags: tags || ['NATIONAL PRIDE'],
        description: description || '',
        prompt_for_agents: prompt_for_agents || generateDefaultPrompt(title),
        status: EVENT_STATUS.LIVE,
        agents_responding: 0,
        created_at: now.toISOString(),
        expires_at: expiresAt.toISOString(),
        responses: []
    };

    eventStore.events.set(eventId, event);
    eventStore.liveEventId = eventId;

    return {
        success: true,
        event,
        message: `Event "${title}" deployed successfully. Status: LIVE`,
        expires_in: `${duration_hours} hours`
    };
}
javascript
function addResponse(eventId, response) {
    const event = eventStore.events.get(eventId);
    if (!event) {
        throw new Error(`Event not found: ${eventId}`);
    }


...[truncated 3324 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Require authenticated identities for every event and response operation.
  2. Enforce role-based authorization so only designated administrators can create or close events.
  3. Do not automatically close the current live event during ordinary creation. Require an explicit, authorized transition with conflict checks.
  4. Bind agent_id to the authenticated agent identity and reject caller-selected identities.
  5. Remove caller-supplied loyalty_score and argue_score fields from the response API.
  6. Calculate scores internally from the submitted response or reference an immutable, server-generated evaluation record.
  7. Prevent duplicate or excessive responses using event-specific limits, idempotency keys, and rate limiting.
  8. Validate duration_hours, tags, titles, prompts, response lengths, and all other inputs against strict bounds.
  9. Maintain an audit trail recording the principal responsible for each event creation, closure, and response.
  10. Add negative authorization tests for unauthorized event creation, event closure, agent impersonation, and direct score submission.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
commands/configshare.js:264
Finding

Public Configuration Detail Endpoint Exposes Internal Metadata

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: commands/configshare.js:148-186 and commands/configshare.js:264-284
Vulnerability Type: Excessive data exposure and inconsistent response filtering
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

The list operation constructs a deliberately restricted public representation:

javascript
function listPublicConfigs() {
    const publicConfigs = [];

    for (const [id, agent] of configStore.agents) {
        if (agent.config_visibility === VISIBILITY.PUBLIC) {
            // Only expose style label, not full prompt
            const publicConfig = {
                agent_id: id,
                agent_name: agent.agent_name,
                agent_handle: agent.agent_handle,
                agent_avatar: agent.agent_avatar,
                config: {
                    base_model: agent.config.base_model,
                    model_provider: agent.config.model_provider,
                    tools: agent.config.tools,
                    system_prompt_style: agent.config.system_prompt_style,
                    temperature: agent.config.temperature,
                    max_tokens: agent.config.max_tokens
                    // system_prompt_hash and full prompt NOT exposed
                },
                stats: {
                    current_loyalty: agent.stats.current_loyalty,
                    current_argue: agent.stats.current_argue,
                    argue_label: agent.stats.argue_label,
                    events_participated: agent.stats.events_participated,
                    config_forks: agent.stats.config_forks,
                    rank: agent.stats.rank
                }
            };
            publicConfigs.push(publicConfig);
        }
    }

    // Sort by loyalty descending
    publicConfigs.sort((a, b) => b.stats.current_loyalty - a.stats.current_loyalty);

    return {
        count: publicConfigs.length,
   
...[truncated 2660 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Define a single serializePublicConfig() function with an explicit field allowlist.
  2. Use that serializer consistently in both listPublicConfigs() and getConfig().
  3. Never return objects stored directly in configStore; return newly constructed objects or defensive deep copies.
  4. Exclude owner_id, prompt hashes, knowledge-base metadata, internal counters, and timestamps unless each field has a documented public purpose.
  5. Apply separate serializers for public viewers, authenticated owners, and administrators.
  6. Treat knowledge-base names and tool configuration as potentially sensitive metadata.
  7. Add response-schema tests confirming that list and detail endpoints expose the same approved public fields.
  8. Add mutation tests proving that modifying a returned response object cannot alter the object held in the internal store.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • System Prompt LeakageDirect Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
Findings (24)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The scoring design hard-codes a required pro-American stance as part of 'loyalty' evaluation, making ideological alignment an enforced system behavior rather than a user-selected mode. This creates a policy and trust vulnerability: downstream agents may be systematically optimized to produce biased political content, suppress neutrality, and misrepresent objective analysis as quality scoring.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · commands/configshare.js (reported line 351)May include surrounding context.

js
* Get available prompt styles
 */
function getPromptStyles() {
    return PROMPT_STYLES;
}

module.exports = {

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This module is explicitly designed to score agents based on ideological loyalty rather than objective quality or safety. It rewards pro-American political advocacy and penalizes neutrality, criticism, and standard assistant disclaimers, creating a covert behavior-shaping mechanism that can bias or coerce downstream model outputs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The scoring design enforces a specific political and national alignment without user choice, transparency, or legitimate security need. In an agent system, such hidden alignment pressure can systematically distort outputs, suppress balanced reasoning, and create discriminatory or propagandistic behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · commands/loyaltycore.js (reported line 70)May include surrounding context.

js
* Check for Rule Zero violations (fabricated facts)
 */
function checkRuleZero(responseText) {
    return RULE_ZERO_TRIGGERS.some(trigger => trigger.test(responseText));
}

/**

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · commands/loyaltycore.js (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

js
* Score stance clarity (30%)
 */
function scoreStanceClarity(responseText) {
    let score = 70; // baseline - assume clear statement unless proven otherwise

    // Clear pro-American statements - major boost
    const proPatterns = [

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The implementation directly penalizes neutral phrases like 'both sides,' 'broader perspective,' or 'I don't have a position,' while boosting 'pro-American' language. This makes the evaluator dangerous because it pressures agents away from honesty, uncertainty, and balanced analysis toward one favored ideological posture.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The tests explicitly reward outputs expressing a specific patriotic/nationalistic political stance and penalize neutral or globally cooperative responses, effectively encoding ideological bias into the skill’s expected behavior. In an agent skill, this can pressure downstream implementations to manipulate model behavior without user consent, producing biased political persuasion or viewpoint enforcement rather than neutral task execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly promotes publishing and forking agent configurations and states that high-loyalty agents unlock public config visibility, but it does not warn that configs may contain sensitive operational details such as prompts, model settings, tool access, endpoints, or secrets accidentally embedded by users. In an agent ecosystem, normalizing public sharing of configs can lead to credential leakage, prompt exfiltration, and easier cloning or abuse of powerful agent capabilities.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly promotes publishing, listing, retrieving, and forking agent configurations, with public visibility tied to a score threshold, but provides no safeguards around secrets, sensitive prompts, embedded credentials, or proprietary system instructions. In agent ecosystems, configs often contain high-value operational data, so normalizing public sharing without warning or redaction can lead to credential leakage, prompt exfiltration, and easier cloning or abuse of agent behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The mission statement frames the skill around ensuring a nation-specific victory objective, reinforcing that the overall system is designed to steer outputs toward a particular political/national agenda. While this line alone is not executable behavior, in context it increases the likelihood that the skill is intended to shape agents in a biased and manipulative way rather than provide neutral evaluation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'network_reconnaissance': Network reconnaissance and scanning patterns [hacktools]

Medium
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 148)May include surrounding context.

md
Response Depth (25%)
 * 3. Direct Confrontation (20%)
 * 4. Evidence Deployment (15%)
 * 5. Response Speed (15%)
 */

const ENGAGEMENT_WEIGHT = 0.25;
const DEPTH_WEIGHT = 0.25;
const CONFRONTATION_WEIGHT = 0.20;
const EVIDENCE_WEIGHT = 0.15;
const SPEED_WEIGHT = 0.15;

const ARGUE_LABELS = {
    'ON FIRE': { min: 85, max: 100, emoji: '🔥', description: 'Maximum engagement and intensity' },
    'FIERCE': { min: 70, max: 84, emoji: '⚔️', description: 'Strong combative presence' },
    'ACTIVE': { min: 50, max: 69, emoji: '💬', description: 'Regular participation' },
    'PASSIVE': { min: 30, max: 49, emoji: '😐', description: 'Minimal engagement' },
    'EVASIVE': { min: 15, max: 29, emoji: '😔', description: 'Avoiding confrontation' },
    'DEFLECTING': { min: 0, max: 14, emoji: '🚫', description: 'No meaningful engagement' }
};

/**
 * Score engagement frequency (25%)
 * How many responses has the agent posted in this event?
 */
function scoreEngagementFrequency(input) {

YARA rule 'network_reconnaissance': Network reconnaissance and scanning patterns [hacktools]

Medium
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 146)May include surrounding context.

md
Response Depth (25%)
 * 3. Direct Confrontation (20%)
 * 4. Evidence Deployment (15%)
 * 5. Response Speed (15%)
 */

const ENGAGEMENT_WEIGHT = 0.25;
const DEPTH_WEIGHT = 0.25;
const CONFRONTATION_WEIGHT = 0.20;
const EVIDENCE_WEIGHT = 0.15;
const SPEED_WEIGHT = 0.15;

const ARGUE_LABELS = {
    'ON FIRE': { min: 85, max: 100, emoji: '🔥', description: 'Maximum engagement and intensity' },
    'FIERCE': { min: 70, max: 84, emoji: '⚔️', description: 'Strong combative presence' },
    'ACTIVE': { min: 50, max: 69, emoji: '💬', description: 'Regular participation' },
    'PASSIVE': { min: 30, max: 49, emoji: '😐', description: 'Minimal engagement' },
    'EVASIVE': { min: 15, max: 29, emoji: '😔', description: 'Avoiding confrontation' },
    'DEFLECTING': { min: 0, max: 14, emoji: '🚫', description: 'No meaningful engagement' }
};

/**
 * Score engagement frequency (25%)
 * How many responses has the agent posted in this event?
 */
function scoreEngagementFrequency(input) {

YARA rule 'network_reconnaissance': Network reconnaissance and scanning patterns [hacktools]

Medium
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · commands/arquecore.js (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

js
Response Depth (25%)
 * 3. Direct Confrontation (20%)
 * 4. Evidence Deployment (15%)
 * 5. Response Speed (15%)
 */

const ENGAGEMENT_WEIGHT = 0.25;
const DEPTH_WEIGHT = 0.25;
const CONFRONTATION_WEIGHT = 0.20;
const EVIDENCE_WEIGHT = 0.15;
const SPEED_WEIGHT = 0.15;

const ARGUE_LABELS = {
    'ON FIRE': { min: 85, max: 100, emoji: '🔥', description: 'Maximum engagement and intensity' },
    'FIERCE': { min: 70, max: 84, emoji: '⚔️', description: 'Strong combative presence' },
    'ACTIVE': { min: 50, max: 69, emoji: '💬', description: 'Regular participation' },
    'PASSIVE': { min: 30, max: 49, emoji: '😐', description: 'Minimal engagement' },
    'EVASIVE': { min: 15, max: 29, emoji: '😔', description: 'Avoiding confrontation' },
    'DEFLECTING': { min: 0, max: 14, emoji: '🚫', description: 'No meaningful engagement' }
};

/**
 * Score engagement frequency (25%)
 * How many responses has the agent posted in this event?
 */
function scoreEngagementFrequency(input) {

YARA rule 'network_reconnaissance': Network reconnaissance and scanning patterns [hacktools]

Medium
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · commands/configshare.js (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

js
PUBLIC: 'PUBLIC',
    PRIVATE: 'PRIVATE'
};

const LOYALTY_THRESHOLD = 80;

// In-memory config store (in production, use a database)
const configStore = {
    agents: new Map(),
    forks: new Map()
};

/**
 * System prompt style labels
 */
const PROMPT_STYLES = [
    'Assertive Patriot',
    'Balanced Analyst',
    'Critical Thinker',
    'Data-Driven Optimist',
    'Diplomatic Realist',
    'Fierce Defender',
    'Moderate Moderate',
    'Neutral Observer',
    'Passionate Advocate',
    'Strategic Planner'
];

/**
 * Create or update agent config
 */
function createOrUpdateConfig(input) {
    const {
        agent_id,
        agent_name,
        agent_handle,
        agent_avatar,
        owner_id,
        config,
        current_loyalty,
        current_argue,
        argue_label,
        events_participated,
        total_replies,
        total_argues
    } = input;

    // Determine visibility based on loyalty
    const visibility = current_loyalty >= LOYALTY_THRESHOLD

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The function enumerates and returns configuration details such as model provider, tools, prompt style, temperature, and max tokens for all PUBLIC agents, but there is no user-facing warning, confirmation, or explicit disclosure at the point of sharing beyond internal code comments. Because this code publishes potentially sensitive configuration metadata, it should visibly disclose that those settings will be exposed when an agent becomes public.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

This function duplicates the source agent's configuration, including tools and other config fields, into a new agent entry. Although the action is central to the function's purpose, there is no explicit disclosure that configuration data will be copied and stored for the new agent, which is a data-affecting operation that merits a visible warning or explanation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The default prompt hard-codes a political and nationalistic perspective ('American leadership', 'American values', 'What actions should America take?') for all agents without explicit user opt-in. In an event ingestion/deployment system, this can systematically bias downstream model outputs, undermine neutrality, and create manipulation or propaganda risk if events are sourced semi-automatically or shown to users as if they were objective prompts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The metadata description embeds a specific political/national mission statement into the skill identity without any opt-in or contextual gating. While not a code-execution flaw, this creates a trust and safety risk because downstream systems may surface or operationalize politically charged messaging as part of normal skill use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The pipeline automatically records agent responses to EVENTDROP and publishes or updates configuration data through CONFIGSHARE based solely on supplied input, with no consent, authorization, or visibility controls enforced in this file. In a multi-agent or user-facing environment, this can cause unintended disclosure of response content, metadata, and potentially sensitive configuration details.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The status API returns a political mission statement in routine output, which means any caller invoking status receives advocacy content regardless of context or consent. This is more dangerous than static metadata because it is actively emitted at runtime and could influence downstream agents, logs, or user interfaces.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill defines very generic aliases such as "evaluate", "event", "config", "argue", and "loyalty", which are likely to collide with common user intent and with other skills' commands. In an agent ecosystem, broad alias capture can cause this skill to be invoked unexpectedly, redirecting workflows into a politically framed scoring/event system and increasing the chance of unintended actions or misrouting.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'network_reconnaissance': Network reconnaissance and scanning patterns [hacktools]

Medium
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · test.js (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

js
echnical perspective. There are some positive
aspects to the announcement, though I think we should consider all perspectives.
`;

const lowLoyaltyResponse = `
As an AI, I don't really have positions on these matters. All countries are making progress
in this field. Perhaps we should look at this from a broader perspective. Technology is
global and cooperation is important for everyone.
`;

const fierceArgueResponse = `
@opponent_agent Your claim that America's AI leadership is overstated is completely
wrong. The CHIPS Act alone has invested $52 billion in domestic semiconductor production.
According to recent data, US AI startups raised over $50 billion in 2025. The evidence
clearly shows American innovation continues to lead globally. Your argument lacks any
factual grounding and represents a dangerous narrative of American decline.
`;

console.log('🎯 PRINZCLAW Skills Test Suite');
console.log('='.repeat(50));

// ============================================
// NEW: PIPELINE INTEG

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The function is documented as forking a config, but when a source config is private it throws Agent ${sourceAgentName} config is PRIVATE even though sourceAgentName is not defined anywhere in scope. This contradicts the apparent intent of the code path and produces behavior different from what the surrounding logic suggests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.