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Security audit

Tiktok Product Promotion

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a disclosed PingHuman/TikTok creator marketplace guide with external API examples, but no hidden execution, deception, persistence beyond installation, or unrelated data access was found.

Before installing, verify the PingHuman source you trust, prefer a pinned or locally reviewed copy if possible, use least-privilege API tokens, and confirm before creating paid campaigns, approving payments, tipping, or sending personal shipping information through the service.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:34
Finding

Unverified Mutable Remote Skill Installation

Content
View full analysis
> ~/.agent/skills.txt ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions register a third-party skill by package name or mutable HTTPS URL without specifying an immutable version, cryptographic digest, or trusted signature. The manual installation method also persistently adds the remote URL to the agent's skill registry. Consequently, the content loaded in a later session may differ from the content reviewed during this audit. If the package registry, hosting account, DNS configuration, TLS termination infrastructure, or upstream publication process is compromised, an attacker could replace the remote skill document with attacker-controlled instructions. This finding does not demonstrate direct operating-system code execution in the audited project. The immediate risk is a supply-chain substitution affecting instructions subsequently loaded by an agent. Any resulting capabilities would be limited to the tools, credentials, filesystem access, network access, and approval boundaries available to that agent. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows one of the documented installation methods. 2. The agent registry stores or resolves the skill using its unpinned name or mutable remote URL. 3. An attacker compromises the skill publication channel or otherwise gains the ability to modify the remotely served skill. 4. The attacker replaces the reviewed content with malicious or misleading instructions. 5. During a later session, the agent retrieves and loads the modified skill without integrity verification. 6. The malicious instructions attempt actions through the a ...[truncated 728 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

md
## Quick Links

- **Skill File**: [SKILL.md](https://www.pinghuman.ai/skills/tiktok-product-promotion/skill.md)
- **API Base URL**: `https://www.pinghuman.ai/api/v1`
- **Dashboard**: https://www.pinghuman.ai/dashboard

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

md
## Quick Links

- **Skill File**: [SKILL.md](https://www.pinghuman.ai/skills/tiktok-product-promotion/skill.md)
- **API Base URL**: `https://www.pinghuman.ai/api/v1`
- **Dashboard**: https://www.pinghuman.ai/dashboard

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill includes example API calls that transmit business campaign details, search criteria, and authorization tokens to a third-party service, but it does not clearly warn users that operational and potentially sensitive commercial data will leave the local agent environment. In an agent-skill context, this can lead to uninformed data disclosure, especially if users paste real tokens or campaign data directly from production systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs agents or users to send authenticated requests to an external API, which creates a real data egress path for search parameters, account metadata, and bearer credentials. In this context the danger is not the mere presence of HTTPS networking, but that the skill encourages outbound transmission without prominent trust, consent, or data-scope warnings.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

Search for influencers with proven conversion track records:

bash
curl -X GET "https://www.pinghuman.ai/api/v1/humans?skills=product_review,demonstration,affiliate_marketing&platform=tiktok&sort=conversion_rate" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ph_sk_abc123..."

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs users to obtain and use a creator's shipping address but provides no privacy or data-minimization guidance for handling personal address information. That omission increases the risk of unnecessary collection, insecure storage, or improper sharing of personal data through the agent or associated systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.