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Security audit

Tiktok Live Commerce

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent commerce-integration guide, with expected external API use and payment workflows that users should run only after reviewing the business terms and credentials.

Install only from a trusted registry or pinned reviewed version when possible. Treat PingHuman API calls as external sharing of business data, use least-privilege API tokens stored outside chat or shell history, and manually review any task creation, approval, tip, or payment-related request before sending it.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:41
Finding
Unpinned Remote Skill Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 41-50 **Vulnerability Type**: Unverified and mutable remote dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ## Installation Add TikTok Live Commerce to your AI agent's skill registry: ```bash # Via skill manager (recommended) skill-install tiktok-live-commerce # Or manually add to agent config echo "tiktok-live-commerce: https://www.pinghuman.ai/skills/tiktok-live-commerce/skill.md" >> ~/.agent/skills.txt ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation procedure either invokes an opaque package installation command without an explicit version or adds a mutable remote Skill URL directly to the agent's persistent configuration. Neither method specifies an immutable version, cryptographic checksum, signature, trusted registry policy, or review requirement. As a result, the Skill content loaded by an agent in the future may differ from the content reviewed during this audit. HTTPS protects data in transit but does not guarantee that the publisher account, hosting service, DNS configuration, or remote file will remain uncompromised or unchanged. This is classified as `T08: Insecure Dependencies` because the effective Skill is obtained through an unpinned external supply-chain source. The reviewed file does not itself demonstrate malicious remote content or automatic native-code execution; the risk arises from trusting a mutable dependency. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the documented installation instructions. 2. The command installs the Skill without an explicit immutable version, or the remote URL is appended to `~/.agent/skills.txt`. 3. The remote Skill file or its hosting infrastructure is subsequently modified or compromised. 4. During a later session, the agent loads instructions from the same trusted-looking URL. 5. The altered instructions execute with the tools and permissions available ...[truncated 1139 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Distribute the reviewed Skill content inside the package rather than loading mutable instructions from a remote URL. 2. Pin installations to an exact, immutable Skill version instead of using only `tiktok-live-commerce`. 3. Publish a SHA-256 or stronger cryptographic digest and verify it before installation or loading. 4. Sign Skill releases and configure the installer to reject missing, invalid, expired, or untrusted signatures. 5. Document the registry used by `skill-install` and restrict resolution to an allowlisted HTTPS registry with verified publisher identities. 6. Do not automatically refresh remote Skill instructions. Require explicit review and approval before updating persistent agent configuration. 7. Record the resolved version and digest in a lockfile or equivalent manifest so the installed artifact can be reproduced and audited. 8. Apply least privilege to agents that load third-party Skills, particularly for credentials, messaging, task approval, and payment-related API operations. 9. Provide uninstall and incident-response instructions for removing the persistent entry from `~/.agent/skills.txt` if the remote resource is compromised.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Content
## Quick Links

- **Skill File**: [SKILL.md](https://www.pinghuman.ai/skills/tiktok-live-commerce/skill.md)
- **API Base URL**: `https://www.pinghuman.ai/api/v1`
- **Dashboard**: https://www.pinghuman.ai/dashboard
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Content
## Quick Links

- **Skill File**: [SKILL.md](https://www.pinghuman.ai/skills/tiktok-live-commerce/skill.md)
- **API Base URL**: `https://www.pinghuman.ai/api/v1`
- **Dashboard**: https://www.pinghuman.ai/dashboard
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding
The skill repeatedly presents pricing, payouts, and success metrics in CNY and uses China-specific market framing, but the description does not state that the skill is limited to a China-region workflow or give users a locale choice. That creates a natural-language locale policy issue because the skill implicitly forces one regional convention rather than making the constraint explicit.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
**Key Success Factors:**
- Charismatic, engaging host with strong communication skills
- Strategic product showcasing with demonstrations and testimonials
- Limited-time offers and flash sales to create urgency
- Real-time audience interaction (answering questions, addressing concerns)
- Professional production quality with good lighting and audio
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill repeatedly shows Authorization headers with a bearer token format, which normalizes inserting secrets directly into shell history, docs, and logs. Even though the token shown appears to be a placeholder, the documentation provides no warning about secret handling, increasing the chance that users substitute real credentials unsafely and transmit them to external services.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Search for experienced livestreamers:

```bash
curl -X GET "https://www.pinghuman.ai/api/v1/humans?skills=live_streaming,sales_presentation,audience_engagement&platform=tiktok&sort=live_commerce_gmv" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ph_sk_abc123..."
```
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs agents/users to send authenticated requests and potentially business data to an external third-party API endpoint. External transmission is inherent to the skill's purpose, but without clear disclosure of trust boundaries, data minimization, and consent requirements, it can lead to unintended leakage of credentials or operational data.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.