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Security audit

Dandan Humanize Text

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a text-rewriting helper that openly optimizes for avoiding AI detectors and includes under-disclosed third-party text submission examples.

Install only if you are comfortable with a skill that is explicitly designed to help text avoid AI-detection systems. Do not use it for academic dishonesty, workplace policy circumvention, fraud, or misrepresenting authorship. Avoid sending confidential, proprietary, personal, student, or regulated text to GPTZero or other external detection services unless you have clear consent and understand the provider's handling of that data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:43
Finding

Unconsented Disclosure of User-Provided Text to a Third-Party Service

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:43-45, SKILL.md:57-58, and SKILL.md:103-104
Vulnerability Type: Third-party transmission of potentially sensitive user content
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippets

macOS and Linux instructions:

bash
curl -s "https://api.gptzero.me/v1/check" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"text": "待检测文本"}'

Windows PowerShell instructions:

powershell
$body = @{"text" = "待检测文本"} | ConvertTo-Json
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://api.gptzero.me/v1/check" -Method POST -Body $body -ContentType "application/json"

The decision tree also recommends using external detection:

text
3. 是否需要检测?
   → 是 → 用 GPTZero / Originality.ai 初检

Technical Analysis

The skill instructs the agent or user to submit the full text being processed to the GPTZero API. It does not require explicit consent before transmission, warn that data will leave the local environment, recommend removing confidential information, or describe the provider's storage and retention practices.

The skill accepts arbitrary user-supplied text, which could contain personal information, proprietary documents, credentials, unpublished material, or regulated data. Sending that text in a plaintext JSON request body over HTTPS protects it in transit but does not prevent the receiving service from reading, storing, logging, or otherwise processing it.

The decision tree makes external detection part of the normal workflow. Although local detection is mentioned elsewhere, it is not established as the privacy-preserving default. The same issue exists in both the shell and PowerShell instructions.

Attack Path

  1. A user supplies sensitive or proprietary text for rewriting.
  2. The user or agent requests detection, or follows the documented decision tree.
  3. The skill's example command places the complete text into the JSON request body.
  4. The command transmits that content to api.gptzero.me.
  5. The external pr ...[truncated 1057 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Make local detection the default and require an explicit opt-in before contacting any external service.
  2. Display a clear warning immediately before transmission that identifies the destination and explains that the submitted text will leave the local environment.
  3. Require affirmative user consent for each external submission rather than inferring consent from a general detection request.
  4. Detect or prompt for removal of credentials, personal information, customer data, proprietary documents, and other sensitive content.
  5. Send only the minimum necessary excerpt when full-document submission is not required.
  6. Document the provider's privacy, retention, logging, training-use, and data-residency policies.
  7. Provide configuration controls that allow administrators to disable external detection entirely.
  8. Update the workflow to distinguish local and remote detection explicitly, for example:
text
Detection requested:
- Default: run local detection.
- External service: explain the destination and privacy implications, redact sensitive data, and obtain explicit consent before transmission.
  1. Avoid claiming or implying that a third-party check is privacy-neutral merely because HTTPS is used; HTTPS protects transport but not data from the receiving provider.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (9)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The description explicitly promotes rewriting text so it can pass AI-detection systems, but provides no warning about academic integrity, workplace compliance, or policy abuse. Framing detector evasion as a feature materially increases misuse risk because it normalizes deceptive uses rather than positioning the tool as neutral editing assistance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 2

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill is explicitly designed to help users paraphrase AI-generated content to avoid AI-content detection, which is an evasion capability. In context, this is dangerous because the skill does not merely improve writing quality; it operationalizes concealment of AI authorship and can facilitate plagiarism, academic dishonesty, or policy circumvention.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad enough to activate on ordinary editing requests such as 'rewrite more naturally' or 'remove AI flavor,' which can silently steer benign user requests into an evasion-focused workflow. In this skill, that overbreadth is more dangerous because the surrounding instructions explicitly optimize for bypassing AI-detection tools, increasing the chance of misuse without clear user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 2

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The trigger conditions explicitly include user intents such as bypassing AI detectors and natural-language variants like 'remove AI flavor,' making the skill readily accessible for detector evasion. This lowers the friction for misuse and increases the probability that ordinary paraphrasing requests are interpreted as deceptive-authorship assistance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to send text to GPTZero's external API but does not clearly warn that the submitted content will leave the local environment and be disclosed to a third party. If users paste sensitive drafts, proprietary material, student work, or regulated data, this can cause unintended data exposure and privacy/compliance issues.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The presence of a hardcoded external GPTZero endpoint indicates the skill is designed to send content to a third-party network service. While not inherently malicious, this is risky in a skill that processes arbitrary user text because it can expose sensitive or regulated information without adequate disclosure or controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

md
python3 /path/to/transform.py "AI 文本内容"

# 检测是否像 AI(需要网络)
curl -s "https://api.gptzero.me/v1/check" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"text": "待检测文本"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The presence of a hardcoded external GPTZero endpoint indicates the skill is designed to send content to a third-party network service. While not inherently malicious, this is risky in a skill that processes arbitrary user text because it can expose sensitive or regulated information without adequate disclosure or controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

md
python3 /path/to/transform.py "AI 文本内容"

# 检测是否像 AI(需要网络)
curl -s "https://api.gptzero.me/v1/check" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"text": "待检测文本"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The PowerShell example also sends user text to GPTZero, duplicating the same third-party disclosure and data-exposure problem across platforms. Repeating the pattern in multiple usage paths increases the likelihood of accidental leakage because network transmission is presented as a normal workflow step.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

检测

$body = @{"text" = "待检测文本"} | ConvertTo-Json Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://api.gptzero.me/v1/check" -Method POST -Body $body -ContentType "application/json"

text

## 改写模式库(来自 patterns.json)

Ssd 2

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The decision tree instructs the user to apply stronger rewriting specifically when the goal is to pass AI detection, which is direct optimization for evasion. That makes the skill more dangerous than generic rewriting guidance because it provides operational direction for defeating screening controls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.