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Security audit

Multi Agent Development-Team Collaboration

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only team-coordination skill that persistently stores shared project notes, with the main risks disclosed and user-directed.

Install only if you want agents to maintain a persistent shared team folder and add workspace guidance pointing to it. Choose DEV_TEAM_ROOT deliberately, keep it out of sensitive repos unless intended, do not store real passwords or API keys in the shared Markdown files, and enable multi-agent routing, channels, or scheduled work only with the sandbox and tool permissions you actually want.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (6)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 372)May include surrounding context.

md
/creating-skills), **`{baseDir}`** is the directory that contains this skill’s `SKILL.md` after installation. That is **orthogonal** to **`TEAM_ROOT`**: `{baseD

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/SKILL-SETUP.md (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

gitignore
.DS_Store
.env
**/*.pem
**/secrets*

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/OPENCLAW_LAYOUT.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md
## Sandbox and Docker

If each agent runs in an isolated sandbox or container, **file tools** only see what is mounted. Mount **`TEAM_ROOT`** at the **same absolute path** in every container that must read or write `team/customers/.../tasks/...`, etc. See [Sandboxing](https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/sandboxing).

## `AGENTS.md` snippet (every participating agent workspace)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The line describes a language change affecting all skill-facing prose and prompts, implying the skill now forces English. Under the policy, language constraints should either offer user opt-in/choice or be clearly documented as justified; this changelog entry provides neither.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The changelog example explicitly states "all skill text in English," which conveys a fixed language requirement in the skill's natural-language guidance. The file does not offer an opt-in language choice or explain a region/compliance reason for enforcing English, so this is a locale-policy issue under the stated rule.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The document explicitly states that multiple agents 'all read/write the same area (absolute paths)' in a shared TEAM_ROOT, but it does not warn about race conditions, accidental overwrites, prompt-poisoned shared state, or integrity controls. In this skill's context, multiple autonomous agents with shared memory and handoffs increase the chance that one compromised, confused, or simply buggy agent can corrupt team state or influence others through shared files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.