T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/remix.py:2- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Are Resolved at Runtime
- Content
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=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai>=1.0.0", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` The documented execution method invokes the script through `uv run`: ```bash uv run {baseDir}/scripts/remix.py --prompt "a cybernetic owl in a neon forest" --filename "owl.png" ``` ### Technical Analysis The inline dependency declarations use open-ended `>=` constraints. No dependency lockfile, exact version constraints, or package hashes are present in the audited project. Consequently, `uv run` may resolve and install future releases from the configured package index without those releases having been reviewed as part of this Skill. The dependency names are consistent with the declared image-processing functionality, and the audit found no evidence that the currently declared packages are intentionally malicious. The security weakness is the absence of reproducible and integrity-controlled dependency resolution. A compromised package publisher account, malicious future release, compromised package index, or unsafe alternate index configuration could cause attacker-controlled Python code to be installed and subsequently imported. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a declared dependency's publishing account, its release infrastructure, or a package index trusted by the runtime. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version that satisfies `google-genai>=1.0.0` or `pillow>=10.0.0`. 3. A user invokes the documented `uv run` command in an environment without a reviewed, immutable lock state. 4. `uv` resolves and installs the malicious compatible release. 5. The script imports the affected dependency: ```python from google import genai from google.genai import types from PIL import Image as PILImage `` ...[truncated 605 chars]- Remediation
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