T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
scripts/requirements.txt:5- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Permit Unreviewed Supply-Chain Changes
- Content
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=2.31.0 beautifulsoup4>=4.12.0 # Tavily API for web search and extract tavily-python>=0.3.0 ``` The installation instructions in `SKILL.md:430` direct users to install these dependencies: ```bash pip install -r requirements.txt ``` ### Technical Analysis Every dependency is specified using a minimum version without an upper bound or an exact version. No lock file or cryptographic package hashes are provided. Consequently, an installation can resolve to future releases or changed transitive dependencies that were not present during this audit. This creates a supply-chain risk because package installation and subsequent imports trust code retrieved from external package repositories. A compromised maintainer account, malicious future release, compromised transitive dependency, or unsafe source distribution build hook could introduce arbitrary code after the Skill itself has been reviewed. The Skill imports and executes these packages as part of its normal operation. In particular, the Tavily package operates in a process that can access `TAVILY_API_KEY`, while `requests` and Beautiful Soup process externally retrieved content. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises one of the declared packages, one of its transitive dependencies, or the associated release infrastructure. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version that still satisfies the broad `>=` constraint. 3. A user follows the documented `pip install -r requirements.txt` instruction. 4. Package resolution selects the malicious or compromised release. 5. Malicious code executes through a build hook, package initialization, or a normal runtime import. 6. The code inherits the Python process's user permissions and can access available files, environment varia ...[truncated 723 chars]- Remediation
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