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Security audit

Konektor - CAPI & Lead Management

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent Konektor API reference for CRM, analytics, workspace, and support workflows, with disclosed remote API calls and no hidden execution or local persistence found.

Use this skill only with a Konektor workspace you control, provide the narrowest API key scopes needed, and require explicit user approval before creating or updating leads or support tickets. Avoid sending unnecessary personal or business data, and verify support ticket priority/status values in Konektor’s current docs because this artifact contains unresolved placeholders.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill documents sending lead, conversion, analytics, workspace, and support-ticket data to a third-party remote service but does not include an explicit privacy or data-sharing warning. In an agent workflow, that omission can cause users or downstream tools to transmit sensitive business and personal data externally without understanding the disclosure boundary.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The skill exposes create and update operations for CRM lead records containing personal data such as names, email addresses, phone numbers, notes, and deal values, but provides no user-facing warning that actions mutate stored customer data. In an agent context, this increases the chance of unintended modification of production records or submission of personal data without informed user approval.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**Example:**

```bash
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"firstName":"Andi","email":"andi@example.com","status":"new","source":"ads","adPlatform":"meta"}' \
  "https://konektor.id/api/v2/agent/leads"
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**Example:**

```bash
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"firstName":"Andi","email":"andi@example.com","status":"new","source":"ads","adPlatform":"meta"}' \
  "https://konektor.id/api/v2/agent/leads"
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
**Example:**

```bash
curl -X PATCH -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"status":"contacted","notes":"Called via WhatsApp"}' \
  "https://konektor.id/api/v2/agent/leads/lead_xyz789"
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The file presents itself as "Machine-readable API documentation" at L006, but the support ticket section contains unresolved placeholders `${ticketPriorities}` and `${ticketStatuses}` instead of actual values. This contradicts the documentation's stated intent because consumers cannot reliably determine the supported values from the document as written.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.