Rate Limit Pro

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 10, 2026 · 9:17 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This is a small, disclosed rate-limiter code snippet with no hidden execution, data access, persistence, or external dependency behavior.

This skill is reasonable to install as a simple rate-limiting helper. For exposed or long-running services, add TTL cleanup, a maximum number of tracked identities, and validation of userId length/source before relying on it in production.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:29

Finding

Unbounded Per-User State Enables Memory Exhaustion

Content

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now - timestamp < tierConfig.window ); // Check if under limit if (validRequests.length >= tierConfig.requests) { const oldestRequest = validRequests[0]; const resetIn = tierConfig.window - (now - oldestRequest); return { allowed: false, reason: 'rate_limit_exceeded', limit: tierConfig.requests, remaining: 0, resetIn: Math.ceil(resetIn / 1000) }; } // Add current request validRequests.push(now); this.requests.set(userId, validRequests); ``` ### Technical Analysis The rate limiter stores request history in a process-wide `Map` indexed by `userId`. Every previously unseen identifier passed to `checkLimit` creates a new entry. There is no global capacity limit, automatic expiration mechanism, periodic cleanup, or eviction policy for inactive identities. Expired timestamps are filtered only when the same `userId` makes another request. Even then, the identifier remains in the map after the filtered array is stored again. The only method that fully removes an entry is `resetUser`, which requires an explicit external call and is not integrated into routine cleanup. Consequently, if an untrusted client can influence `userId`, it can continuously submit unique identifiers and cause persistent heap growth. Very long identifier strings can further increase memory consumption. Per-identity rate limits do not prevent this attack because each new identifier receives an independent quota. ### Attack Path 1. An application instantiates `RateLimiter` in a long-running Node.js process. 2. The application passes a client-contro ...[truncated 1460 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.