Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a real-money trading skill whose core API use is mostly disclosed, but it also documents persistent server-side automated and copy-trading features that materially expand risk beyond the top-level description.
Review this skill carefully before installing. Only use it with an account and budget you are willing to expose to live Polymarket trading, avoid enabling autonomous or copy-trade strategies unless you understand they can place trades while you are inactive, prefer dry runs and tight maxBudget limits, and be cautious with token approvals, especially any approve-all option.
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
Cancel an open order. Only orders with status PENDING, OPEN, or PARTIALLY_FILLED can be cancelled.
DELETE /orders/{orderId}
Example:
The token approval endpoint explains how to fix allowance errors but does not prominently warn that approval grants a contract authority to move the specified tokens from the user's wallet. Wallet approvals are security-sensitive, and users may not understand they are extending transfer permissions beyond a single trade.
The strategy section describes server-side autonomous trading that evaluates rules and places trades automatically, but it lacks a prominent warning that real-money orders may execute without per-trade user confirmation. In a financial skill, omission of that warning is dangerous because users may authorize persistent automation without understanding that funds can be committed while they are inactive.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Example: For URL https://polymarket.com/event/btc-updown-15m-1770129900
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $LUCKYLOBSTER_API_KEY" \
"https://luckylobster.io/api/agent/v1/markets/by-slug?slug=btc-updown-15m-1770129900"
The redemption section says POST /settlements/redeem can redeem all positions, but it does not present this as a prominent warning before examples that omit filters. Because the default behavior may trigger a batched on-chain action affecting all eligible positions, users could unintentionally perform a bulk financial operation.
The manifest says the skill is for searching markets, placing orders, and managing positions, but the documentation also exposes autonomous server-side strategies and copy-trading. That hidden expansion of capability materially changes the risk profile because it enables unattended real-money actions and third-party wallet mirroring that a user may not expect from the declared scope.
The copy-trading feature monitors another wallet's on-chain activity in near real time and automatically mirrors trades. While on-chain data is public, this is a materially different and more sensitive behavior than ordinary market search/trading, and it can facilitate risky automated financial behavior without clear disclosure in the skill purpose.
The file documents how to place BUY/SELL orders and notes execution behavior, but it does not plainly warn that this endpoint can immediately spend USDC, acquire exposure, or leave resting orders on the book. For a trading skill, the operation is core functionality, but the markdown criteria still call for user-facing warnings where behavior can affect user data or system integrity; here, user funds are impacted.
Skill requests more permissions than appear necessary for its stated functionality. Review if elevated access is justified.
}
All linked agents receive standard permissions: **read** (view markets/orders/positions), **trade** (buy/sell), **cancel** (cancel orders), and **redeem** (settle positions).
**Step 4: Store the API Key**
No suspicious patterns detected.