T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:710- Finding
Unspecified External Synchronization and Cross-Skill Propagation of Customer Data
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:710-715
Vulnerability Type: Excessive data access, external synchronization, and cross-skill data propagation
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
text ## 17. Интеграция с OpenClaw - Сделки и лиды хранятся в memory/ агента, синхронизируются через Supabase - Работает с AI-Поддержка: клиент из поддержки → триггер лида на допродажу - Работает с AI-Аналитик: данные воронки → автоматический дашборд и прогнозы - Работает с Контент-мастер: кейсы → контент → новые лиды - Follow-up ставится на таймер через AI-Офис - Win/loss данные → автоматически в отчёт для OpenClawTechnical Analysis
The skill instructs the agent to persist lead and deal records in agent memory, synchronize those records through an unspecified Supabase service, and propagate related data to support, analytics, content, office, and reporting workflows.
Lead and deal records may contain personal information, customer communications, commercial terms, pipeline details, and other confidential business information. These instructions do not define:
- The Supabase endpoint, tenant, or data controller
- The exact fields transmitted or retained
- User or workspace consent requirements
- Authentication and authorization boundaries
- Data minimization and redaction rules
- Retention and deletion policies
- Access restrictions for downstream skills
- Restrictions on secondary use, such as converting customer cases into marketing content
This exceeds the minimum permissions required for a text-based sales-advice skill. It also broadens the number of components able to access customer data, increasing the consequences of a compromised or incorrectly configured integration.
No executable Supabase client, endpoint, or synchronization implementation was found in the audited project. Therefore, the audit does not confirm that data is currently transmitted by the included shell scripts. The risk arises from operational instructions that ...[truncated 1557 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Default to session-only, local processing and disable persistence or synchronization unless the user explicitly opts in.
- Require separate, informed confirmation before storing lead or deal data, synchronizing it externally, or transferring it to another skill.
- Specify and validate an allowlisted Supabase endpoint, tenant, region, and data controller.
- Document the exact fields collected, their processing purpose, retention period, and deletion procedure.
- Minimize stored fields and redact personal data, credentials, payment information, contract contents, and confidential communications.
- Use tenant-isolated storage, row-level security, scoped service credentials, encryption in transit, and encryption at rest.
- Grant each downstream skill access only to the minimum fields required for its declared function.
- Prohibit support-to-sales and customer-case-to-content reuse unless the user separately authorizes that purpose.
- Add auditable controls to inspect, export, delete, and disable synchronization of stored records.
- Clearly distinguish implemented integrations from aspirational functionality so an agent does not interpret unsupported claims as authorization to transmit data.
