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Security audit

Anyone Procotol Proxy

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for running an Anyone Network SOCKS proxy, but it asks users to install and run a mutable third-party npm package with network-traffic authority and limited risk guidance.

Review this before installing. Use a pinned, reviewed package version where possible, avoid global installation, run the proxy with least privilege, and do not route secrets or regulated data through it unless you have approved the provider, environment, and compliance posture.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:10
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Is Installed and Executed## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 10–30 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned and mutable npm dependency execution **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```yaml metadata: clawdbot: requires: packages: - "@anyone-protocol/anyone-client" ``` ```bash npm install -g @anyone-protocol/anyone-client ``` ```bash npx @anyone-protocol/anyone-client -s 9050 ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill directs users to install and execute `@anyone-protocol/anyone-client` without specifying an exact reviewed version or an integrity hash. Both the global installation command and the `npx` invocation rely on mutable package-registry state. Consequently, the code executed when the instructions are followed may differ from the code available when the skill was audited. Installing the package globally increases its local reach and may execute npm lifecycle scripts. The subsequent `npx` command executes the package CLI, potentially downloading it from the configured npm registry if it is not already available locally. This creates a supply-chain trust boundary that is not protected by version pinning, lockfile verification, artifact integrity validation, or source verification. There is no evidence in the reviewed file that the named dependency is currently malicious. The vulnerability is the unsafe installation and execution pattern, which exposes users to future package, maintainer-account, registry, or publication-channel compromise. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package maintainer account, package publication process, configured npm registry, or another relevant supply-chain component. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version of `@anyone-protocol/anyone-client`. 3. A user follows the skill instructions and runs the unpinned global installation or `npx` command. 4. npm resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled package version. 5. Malicious lifecycle ...[truncated 999 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the dependency to an exact version that has undergone security review, rather than relying on the registry's current default version. 2. Install the dependency locally inside a dedicated project instead of globally, and execute only the locally installed binary. 3. Commit and enforce a lockfile with package integrity metadata. Use deterministic installation commands such as `npm ci` where applicable. 4. Verify the package source, publisher identity, provenance, signatures, and integrity before installation. 5. Avoid an unqualified `npx` invocation. If `npx` is required, specify the exact reviewed package version and configure it not to accept an unexpected remote replacement. 6. Disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation where compatible with the package, then explicitly run only reviewed setup operations. 7. Execute the proxy with least privilege in an isolated account, container, or sandbox with restricted filesystem, environment-variable, credential, and network access. 8. Bind the SOCKS proxy explicitly to the loopback interface and prevent access from untrusted local or remote users. 9. Document the trusted npm registry and implement dependency monitoring so newly disclosed package or transitive-dependency risks can be identified promptly.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly enables routing requests through an anonymity network and hidden-service access but does not warn about legal, policy, monitoring, logging, attribution, or sensitive-data risks. That omission can mislead users into overtrusting the privacy properties of the proxy, increasing the chance of unsafe or noncompliant use in monitored or regulated environments.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
Using `npx @anyone-protocol/anyone-client` without a pinned version causes execution of whatever package version is current at runtime, which creates a supply-chain risk if the package is updated maliciously, compromised, or unexpectedly changed. In this skill, the command starts a local proxy process that can handle network traffic, so compromise could lead to traffic interception, arbitrary code execution in the user environment, or covert persistence.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.